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This dissertation makes progress on the mind-body problem 
by examining certain key features of epistemic defeasibility, 
introspection, peer disagreement, and philosophical methodology. In 
the standard thought experiments, dualism strikes many of us as 
true. And absent defeaters, we should believe what strikes us as true. 
In the first three chapters, I discuss a variety of proposed defeaters—
undercutters, rebutters, and peer disagreement—for the seeming 
truth of dualism, arguing that not one is successful. In the fourth 
chapter, I develop and defend a novel argument from the 
indefeasibility of certain introspective beliefs for the conclusion that 
persons are not complex objects like brains or bodies. This argument 
reveals the non-mechanistic nature of introspection.
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In the standard thought experiments, dualism strikes many 
philosophers as true. Among these philosophers are many non-
dualists. This ‘striking’ generates prima facie justification: in the 
absence of defeaters, we ought to believe that things are as they seem 
to be. In this paper, I examine several proposed undercutting 
defeaters for our dualist intuitions. I argue that these proposals all 
fail, either because they rest on false assumptions, require empirical 
evidence that they lack, or because they overgenerate defeaters. It 
follows, then, that our prima facie justification for dualism is as-of-
yet undefeated. 
 
1. Dualism and Non-Dualism 
Naturalism is widespread in contemporary philosophy. 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to say what naturalism is. Perhaps it is a 
purely ontological commitment: all and only those entities currently 
posited by our best scientific theories exist, along with certain natural 
composites of these fundamental entities. However, given the 
inevitable progression of science, some naturalists are reluctant to 
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commit themselves to naturalism so understood. After all, in a few 
short decades our best scientific theories will no doubt posit different 
entities, in which case naturalism is currently false. Perhaps it is 
better to construe naturalism as a certain type of research program: a 
disposition to treat as basic all and only the evidence gained from our 
best scientific methods (cf. Rea 2002).  
Many philosophers feel a tension between their naturalism on 
the one hand and their mental lives on the other hand. On the one 
hand, there are what we may call “naturalistically-acceptable” types 
of states, i.e. those state types the existence of which is well-
supported by the evidence we’ve gained from our best scientific 
methods. On the other hand, there are our mental states. And these  
do not obviously fit into this framework of naturalistically-acceptable 
state types. No doubt our mental state tokens correlate very nicely 
with naturalistically-acceptable state tokens; the problem, if there is 
one, occurs at the level of types. With which naturalistically 
acceptable state types shall we identify our mental state types?  
This is a difficult question with no clear answer. Nevertheless, 
many philosophers believe that for any mental state type M, there is 
some type T such that T is a naturalistically-acceptable state type (e.g. 
a physical brain state type,1 or some physical-functional state type,2 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Empirical candidates for such a physical type are displaying activity in the 
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or some purely formal functional state type,3 or some physical 
representational state type4), and M is identical with T. I will call 
those philosophers non-dualists. Other philosophers believe that there 
is at least one mental type that is not identical with any 
naturalistically-acceptable state type. I will call those philosophers 
dualists.  
Unhappily, the vagueness inherent in the term “naturalism” 
spills over into “dualism” and “non-dualism,” as I’ve defined them. 
Just what types of states count as acceptable to naturalism? I will 
here briefly address some common views in the literature, and say 
whether I take them to count as forms of dualism or non-dualism.   
I take the following as paradigm cases of naturalistically-
acceptable state types: physical brain state types, physical-functional 
state types, purely formal functional state types, physical 
representational state types. And so, as I understand non-dualism, it 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
pyramidal cells of layer 5 of the cortex involving reverberatory circuits (cf. 
Block and Stalnaker 1999), or being cortio-thalamic oscillation or being C-
fibers firing. 
2 I have in mind here a chauvinistic functionalism. An empirical candidate 
for such a physical-functional state type would embed empirical 
information into our Ramsey sentence. See e.g. Block 2006.  
3 This is what Block calls the “deflationary” view: phenomenal properties 
are identical to some purely formal functional type, i.e. our Ramsey 
sentence has no empirical information.  
4 For example, a PANIC state realized in the brain that represents tissue 
damage as bad (Tye 1995, 2000, 2006). Or perhaps a representational 
state realized in the brain that represents a cluster of properties 
nonconceptually, which properties are suitably poised to bring about 
cognitive responses (Tye 2007). Presumably, properties in this cluster are 
not irreducibly non-physical. 
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clearly includes standard brain-state identity theories. Standard 
forms of functionalism as I understand them tend to clearly count as 
non-dualist theories, since they countenance in their Ramsey 
sentences only property types that uncontroversially count as 
naturalistically acceptable. And many forms of representationalism 
will count as non-dualist, since such theories countenance only 
naturalistically-acceptable state types in the contents of experiences. 
Consider now a view on which mental state types are 
composed by but perhaps not identical with naturalistically-acceptable 
state types. Such a view comes in several varieties. Those varieties 
that say mental state types are not identical with naturalistically-
acceptable mental state types count as forms of dualism, as I’ve 
defined it. Those varieties on which mental state types are identical 
with naturalistically-acceptable mental state types (though perhaps 
not those same types of which they are composed) count as forms of 
non-dualism. 
 Consider now what we might call, following Richard 
Spencer-Smith (1995), “radical emergentism”: mental state types are 
novel, and no naturalistically-acceptable theory can predict or 
explain the appearance of them. (Here, a mental state type P is 
“novel” is the sense that we have P, but none of our constituents 
have any determinate state types of the same determinable as P.) 
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Again, such a view comes in several varieties. Those varieties that 
say mental state types are not identical with naturalistically-
acceptable mental state types count as forms of dualism, as I’ve 
defined it. Those varieties on which mental state types are identical 
with naturalistically-acceptable mental state types (though perhaps 
not those same types from which they “emerge”) count as forms of 
non-dualism. 
Some may find my use of “dualism” and “non-dualism” as 
departing from their traditional uses in this debate. Perhaps that’s 
right. My interest, however, is to explore and evaluate non-
naturalistic theories of the mind. I intend for “dualism” to cover all 
and only those views which posit one of more types of properties the 
existence of which would be inconsistent with naturalism, even if 
these properties supervene with metaphysical necessity on 
naturalistically-acceptable properties.  
 
2. Dualist Intuitions 
Many dualists believe dualism because, they say, propositions 
that clearly entail dualism seem true to them in light of well-known 
thought experiments.5 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Similarly, most of us believe that knowledge is not justified true belief 
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For example, consider yourself with an autocerebroscope 
arranged in such a way that you can observe the states of your own 
brain and the interactions of its parts in exquisite detail, while you 
experience pain. Let the type-demonstrative concept THIS – 
deployed introspectively – refer to the horrible felt quality type of 
pain. Let THAT refer to whichever of the candidate naturalistically-
acceptable types you care to demonstrate.  Now consider each 
instance of the following proposition: 
 Possibility: This and that are not necessarily coextensional. 
Many philosophers—including many non-dualists—have reported 
the seeming truth of Possibility with respect to at least some type-
identity claims. For example, Saul Kripke (1972, p. 147), inspired by 
Descartes, says “just as it seems that the brain state could have 
existed without any pain, so it seems that the pain could have existed 
without the corresponding brain state.” David Papineau (2002, 85) 
reports that “...it certainly seems possible that these properties should 
come apart,” and admits that zombies and ghosts seem possible 
(ibid., 94). Christopher Hill (1996, 67) accepts the “apparent 
separability of pain and C-fiber stimulation.” Speaking of Kripke's 
intuition, Colin McGinn (2003, 153) says that our correct theory 
“must deactivate the intuitions of contingency that surround our 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
because it sure seems like Gettier’s Smith, who has a justified true belief, 
doesn’t know. That’s the sense of “seem” relevant to this dualist claim. 
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thinking about the relation between the mind and the body.” And 
Thomas Polger (2004, 42) says “It certainly seems that my pain now 
could have been other than, say, activation of C-fiber #237 now… 
Mind-brain identity claims have the appearance of contingency.” 
 Possibility has been widely discussed in the literature. It 
entails but is not entailed by a much less-discussed non-modal 
proposition that straightforwardly entails dualism:6  
 Non-Identity: This is not identical with that. 
Many philosophers–including many non-dualists–have reported the 
seeming truth of Non-Identity, with respect to at least some of the 
type-identity claims above:  
• Papineau (2002, 3): “We find it almost impossible to free 
ourselves from the dualist thought that conscious feelings 
must be something additional to any material goings-on... the 
compelling intuition that the mind is ontologically distinct 
from the material world... we feel it is obvious that conscious 
states are not material states.”  
• Daniel Dennett (1992, 27): “It does seem as if the happenings 
that are my conscious thoughts and experiences cannot be 
brain happenings, but must be something else, something 
caused or produced by brain happenings, no doubt, but 
something in addition...”  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 We should not accept a modal-separability criterion for property 
distinctness. After all, there are examples of properties–ways things 
could be–that are distinct even though they could not fail to be 
coinstantiated. Triangularity and trilaterality, for example.   
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• Christopher Hill (2005, 153): “When I am attending 
introspectively to a pain, I am aware of something that 
appears to resist characterization in terms of neuroscientific 
concepts. To apply neuroscientific concepts to it would be like 
applying them to a patch of blue sky.” 
• Peter van Inwagen (2009): “[The Hard Problem is] the 
question: ‘How could this collection of molecules actually 
have this kind of awareness that is my feeling of pain or 
orange?’ And indeed I don’t see how it could. In fact, it looks 
to me as if it couldn’t, except for the fact that it does.”7 
 
Somewhat surprisingly, Non-Identity seems true even to hardcore 
eliminative materialists. According to Stephen Stich (1991, 1996), the 
motivating idea of eliminative materialism is that some theoretical 
terms fail to refer due to a high degree of mismatch between reality and 
the supposed nature of this theoretical posit. So, for example, Richard 
Rorty (1965) and many after him suggest that the folk theoretical 
expression “demon possession” fails to refer since the reality of the 
situation—manifestations of hallucinatory psychosis or epilepsy—is 
very different from the supposed nature of demon possession. Due to 
this high degree of mismatch (and our preference for the 
neuroscientific theory), Rorty and others say that “demon 
possession” fails to refer; really, there isn’t any demon possession.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Of course, here Van Inwagen just reports an intuition that this collection of 
molecules couldn’t have phenomenal states. But since presumably he also 
thinks that this collection of molecules could token the relevant 
naturalistically-acceptable reductive types mentioned above, I take it that 
Non-Identity also seems true to him. 
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 Now, according to Stich, the idea behind Rorty's 
“disappearance theory” and later eliminativist views seems to be that 
very many if not all folk-psychological terms (such as “pain”) fail to 
refer, due to a high degree of mismatch between the supposed nature 
of these theoretical entities and reality. That is, Non-Identity seems 
true to these theorists, and this seeming is recalcitrant in the face of 
neuroscience. But given their commitment to materialism, they opt to 
deny that folk-psychological terms refer. For example, Paul 
Feyerabend (1963a, 295) says that the “usual” or “ancient” sense of 
the term mental is essentially non-materialistic, and (1963b, 54) that, 
on the basis of introspection, it appears that thoughts (if they exist) 
are very different from material processes. But he embraces reductive 
materialism. He therefore advocates saying there are no mental 
processes in this sense, and that there are no thoughts. And so it is in 
large part the seeming truth of Non-Identity– i.e. his strong dualist 
intuition–that drives him to this conclusion. 
 So, Possibility and Non-Identity seem true to wide variety of 
philosophers, including many non-dualists.8  Of course, in that 
respect these propositions are not unique: there are very many 
propositions concerning pain that seem obviously true in this way. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Eliminativists count as non-dualists on my definition, since they claim that 
there are no mental state types, and so they claim it’s false that there is 
some mental state type that fails to be identical with some reductive 
type. That is, they claim dualism is false. 
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For example, it seems obvious that pain is not pleasure, and that a 
state of affairs could include pain and yet not include anything 
circular. Yet such propositions do not straightforwardly entail 
dualism. By contrast, Non-Identity clearly entails dualism,9 and 
Possibility clearly entails Non-Identity.10 And, to repeat, these 
propositions seem true even to many non-dualists. They also seem 
true to me. Perhaps they seem true to you as well. 
 This dissertation examines a novel argument for the 
conclusion that we should be dualists. Since the central argument 
crucially depends on the standard methodology of philosophy, I will 
call it “the Methodological Argument.” 
David Chalmers (1996) famously argues for dualism with 
respect to phenomenal mental state types – for example, the awful 
felt quality type of pain.11 Chalmers’ argument for dualism is widely 
regarded as the best contemporary argument for dualism. However, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 More precisely, the proposition that this is not that, or that, or that… (where 
each deployment of THAT refers to a distinct member of the domain of 
candidate reductive types and every member of that domain is referred 
to by an instance of THAT) both intellectually seems true and clearly 
entails dualism. 
10
 Non-Identity by itself entails that non-dualism–as I have defined it–is 
false, but is consistent with a Nagelian-style primitivism, according to 
which mental phenomena supervene on physical phenomena in virtue of 
some metaphysically necessary relation which is not identity. As I have 
defined dualism, Nagelian primitivism is a form of dualism. Possibility 
is stronger, entailing that there is a metaphysically possible world in 
which this and that come apart, and therefore it entails that Nagelian 
primitivism is false. 
11 Pinch yourself hard. That type of feeling. 
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his argument relies on two-dimensional semantics, peculiar notions 
of conceivability, and the claim that the conceivability of zombie 
worlds entails their possibility.12 Critics have attacked all three of 
these parts of the argument.  
To its credit, the Methodological Argument that I examine in 
this dissertation sidesteps these controversies that plague Chalmers’ 
argument. Instead of relying on two-dimensional semantics, the 
Methodological Argument uses the widely accepted standard 
justificatory procedure of philosophy. And instead of using 
Chalmers’ notions of conceivability, the Methodological Argument 
uses a minimal and uncontroversial notion of intellectual seeming 
(more on this below). Finally, the Methodological Argument does not 
require that conceivability entail possibility. For these reasons, the 
Methodological Argument that I consider in this dissertation is far 
more threatening to non-dualism than Chalmers’ argument. 
 
3. Intellectual Seemings  
 The verb “to seem” has many senses. In the doxastic sense, it 
seems like the Republicans will pick up some congressional seats in 
2012. In the visual sense, it seems like the stick in that glass of water is 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12
 Though Chalmers (2010) provides an intentionally non-technical argument for 
dualism that relies only on considerations about structure and function. 
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bent (though I don’t believe that it is). In a third sense, the naïve 
comprehension axiom seems true, even though I don’t currently 
believe it since I’ve seen compelling proofs of its falsity. It is this third 
sense of “to seem” that the Methodological Argument uses. I will call 
this sense the “intellectual” sense, and I will speak of “intellectual 
seemings.” This is a type of conscious episode, distinct from 
occurrently believing and sensorily experiencing, in which a 
proposition strikes one as obviously true, i.e. in which one 
apparently just sees the truth of a proposition.13  
 Like much else in philosophy (e.g. causation, numbers, 
induction, universals, consciousness), intellectual seemings may 
appear mysterious or exotic upon reflection. But at the same time, 
they’re as common as dirt. For example, if you learn that Alan is 
taller than Bob, and that Bob is taller than Charles, the proposition 
Alan is taller than Charles will – upon consideration – seem true to you 
in this sense of “seem.” And if you learn that I’m angry with a man 
named “Smith,” it will seem to you – upon consideration and again 
in this intellectual sense of the verb “seem” – that the man Smith is 
not an even integer. And very many of our cherished logical rules 
seem true to us upon consideration in this same sense of “seem,” 
from modus ponens to De Morgan’s laws.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 See Conee 1998 for more on “seeing the truth” of a proposition. 
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 Intellectual seemings are distinct from both of Chalmers’ 
(2010, chapter 6) varieties of conceivability featured in his most well-
known argument for dualism. There, he distinguishes negative 
conceivability – where p is negatively conceivable for S just in case p 
cannot be ruled out a priori by S – from positive conceivability – 
where p is positively conceivable for S just in case S “can (in 
principle) clearly and distinctly imagine a situation” in which p is 
true. The Methodological Argument departs from Chalmers’ 
argument in this important respect: for p to intellectually seem true is 
not for p to be conceivable, either positively or negatively. Let me 
explain. 
 A proposition can intellectually seem true without it being 
negatively conceivable. For example, the naïve comprehension axiom 
intellectually seems true to me, and yet I can rule it out a priori with 
the aid of well-known proofs. Also a proposition can be negatively 
conceivable, and yet not intellectually seem true. For example, I 
cannot rule out Goldbach’s conjecture a priori, and yet it does not 
intellectually seem true to me. Therefore intellectual seeming is not 
negative conceivability. Neither is it positive conceivability, since it 
intellectually seems to me that the number 17 is prime, even though I 
cannot even in principle form a mental image of the number 17 at all, 
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and therefore I cannot form a mental image in which the number 17 
is prime.14  
 To recap, intellectual seemings are common and familiar to 
us. So their existence should be uncontroversial. And a proposition 
may intellectually seem true to S without S thereby believing it or 
even being disposed to believe it, as happens with the naïve 
comprehension axiom.15 And, finally, intellectual seemings are 
distinct from both of Chalmers’ varieties of conceivability.  
 
4. The Methodological Argument for Dualism 
 The standard justificatory procedure in philosophy (cf. Bealer 
1992 and 1996) counts all the following as prima facie evidence: 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 Objection: One can very easily form a mental image of the numeral “17”. 
And that’s in fact how one positively conceives of propositions involving 
the number 17. Response: In that case, positive conceivability is still not 
intellectual seeming, since 17 is red will then be positively conceivable 
(just imagine a red-colored “17”) and yet will not intellectually seem 
true. Another Objection: One may very easily form a mental image of a 
situation in which 17 is prime is true. That proposition is true in every 
possible situation. So imagine any possible situation you like, and you’ve 
succeeded. Response: In that case, positive conceivability is still not 
intellectual seeming, since then either Goldbach’s conjecture or its 
negation will be positively conceivable, and yet neither intellectually 
seems true. 
15 On a liberal sense of “disposed to believe,” I am disposed to believe the 
naïve comprehension axiom, since I would believe it given the right 
evidence base (namely, given its seeming truth and a lack of defeaters 
that I actually have). But even on this liberal sense of “disposed to 
believe,” dispositions to believe are not intellectual seemings: I am 
disposed to believe (in this liberal sense) that John McCain is President, 
since I would believe it given a certain evidence base. And yet that 
proposition doesn’t intellectually seem true to me.  
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experiences, observations, testimony, and – importantly— 
intellectual seemings such as those elicited by dualist thought 
experiments. Examples of this procedure abound: Gettier’s refutation 
of K=JTB, Chisholm's perceptual relativity refutation of 
phenomenalism, Putnam's Spartan-pretender refutation of 
behaviorism, all the various twin-earth examples, Burge's arthritis 
example, multiple realizability, etc. These examples all involve the 
evidential use of intellectual seemings, which some philosophers call 
“intuitions.” 
 So widespread philosophical practice and methodology 
supports the view that intellectual seemings confer at least prima 
facie, defeasible justification. I will take it that this widespread 
practice is correct: intellectual seemings give us defeasible 
justification.16 How are intellectual seemings defeasible? Pollock 
(1974) distinguishes between two types of defeaters: rebutting and 
undercutting. Rebutting defeaters, in this case, are arguments or 
evidence for the negation of Possibility or the negation of Non-
Identity.  
 An undercutting defeater, on the other hand, is more difficult 
to characterize. Pollock’s classic analysis would have it that an 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 Note that this claim is weaker than Michael Huemer’s (2007, 30) 
phenomenal conservatism, which entails that every kind of seeming 
confers prima facie justification. 
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undercutting defeater, in this case, is a reason to think that the 
following subjunctive conditional is false: dualism would not seem 
true unless it were true. This analysis is not uncontroversial, 
however. Whatever the right analysis of undercutting defeat turns 
out to be, an undercutting defeater attacks the relation between one’s 
belief and the grounds on which one holds the belief. In this 
dissertation, we will rely only on the following necessary condition 
for an undercutting defeater: some consideration is a successful 
undercutting defeater for a subject S’s rational belief B only if upon 
learning of the consideration S can no longer rationally persist in 
holding B. We will test proposed undercutting defeaters by seeing 
whether such a consideration entails that a subject could not 
rationally persist in her belief. 
 As it stands, those of us to whom Possibility and Non-
Identity intellectually seem true are prima facie justified in believing 
them. Ultima facie justification results from searching for defeaters to 
an extent that satisfies our relevant epistemic obligations and finding 
none. Furthermore, not only are we permitted to believe Possibility 
and Non-Identity in the absence of defeaters, but we epistemically 
ought to. For it is plausible that for any subject S, if S is permitted to 
believe that p and (i) it's not the case that S is permitted to suspend 
belief that p, and (ii) it's not the case that S is permitted to believe that 
not-p, then S ought to believe that p. It's always nice, after all, to gain 
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one more true belief. And if you find yourself in a situation in which 
you are epistemically permitted only to believe that p, then you 
ought to believe that p (that’s your best bet, so to speak). Therefore 
we epistemically ought to believe Possibility and Non-Identity unless 
we have or gain access to defeaters for them.   
 Progress on the mind-body problem might be made, 
therefore, by establishing whether there are any defeaters for the 
seeming truth of Possibility and Non-Identity. Let’s call this “the 
Methodological Argument for Dualism.” In the present chapter, our 
project is to examine several proposed undercutting defeaters. We 
will ask whether the type of consideration proposed entails that a 
subject could not rationally persist in her belief. We will find that, in 
each case, the answer is ‘no’. 
 
5. Undercutting Dualism 
5.1. Unreliability with respect to seemings generally? 
 If I examine the track record and learn that the majority of 
beliefs produced by my memory have been false, I thereby gain a 
defeater for any belief I currently hold on the basis of memory. 
Similar considerations apply to the seemings relevant to the 
Methodological Argument. One might suspect that if I examine the 
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track record and learn that the majority of beliefs I have held on the 
basis of seemings have been false, I thereby gain a defeater for any 
belief I currently hold on the basis of a seeming, e.g. my belief in 
Possibility and my belief in Non-Identity. 
 I have met people with a high degree of confidence that an 
examination of the track record of my beliefs based on seemings 
would in fact reveal that seemings are unreliable. These people have 
claimed that tables seem not to be mostly empty space, that the Earth 
seems to be flat, and that it seems possible for a world to have water 
but no H2O. Yet, these people continue, science has taught us that 
these seemings are mistaken. And, they add, there are many other 
cases in which things have been other than how they seemed to be. 
So, they conclude, we have a defeater for any beliefs that we 
currently hold on the basis of a seeming, including belief in 
Possibility and belief in Non-Identity. 
 
5.2  Response 
 Possibility and Non-Identity seem true in the intellectual 
sense of “seem.” This sense, recall, is distinct from the doxastic sense, 
i.e. inclinations to believe. Consider, for example, the naïve 
comprehension axiom, which continues to seem true to me in the 
sense relevant to the Methodological Argument, and yet which I am 
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not inclined to believe (in a non-trivial sense of “inclined to believe”). 
Intellectual seemings, recall, are also distinct from visual seemings, 
i.e. that sense of “seem” in which it seems to me that there is a white 
surface with black markings before me. 
 So, my beliefs in Possibility and in Non-Identity are based on 
intellectual seemings. Yet, contrary to the above objection, it would 
not automatically follow from the fact that seemings in general are 
unreliable that intellectual seemings are unreliable. Similarly, one’s 
vision might be impeccable even if every other sense modality were 
completely unreliable. Though, on the whole, such a person’s beliefs 
based on sense perception might be unreliable, neverthless her 
beliefs based on vision may be completely trustworthy. The same 
may go with seemings in general and intellectual seemings in 
particular. So the objection must show that our intellectual seemings 
do not track the truth. 
 But examples of mistaken seemings – in the sense of 
“seeming” relevant to the Methodological Argument – are not nearly 
so numerous as some may believe. I contend that the seemings 
involved in the above claims – namely the claims that tables seem not 
to be mostly empty space, that the Earth seems flat, and that it seems 
possibly for a world to have water but no H2O – are either not 
intellectual seemings and so not by themselves damaging to the 
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Methodological Argument, or are intellectual seemings but are not 
mistaken.  Let me first discuss the case of tables and the shape of the 
Earth. 
 It’s true that tables are mostly empty space, and it’s true that 
most people unenlightened by science fail to believe that they are, 
and in fact may believe that they are not. I was once a member of that 
group. But, in my case at least, the belief that tables are not mostly 
empty space was not based on an intellectual seeming. Nor, I think, 
did it even visually seem to me that tables are not mostly empty 
space. As we know, tables that are mostly empty space can look the 
same as tables that are not mostly empty space. And so our visual 
seemings that attend the viewing of tables are consistent with both 
hypotheses; our visual experience while viewing tables is therefore 
not aptly described as seeming not to be mostly empty space. No, it is 
rather that tables, upon viewing, fail to seem to be mostly empty 
space. The inclination to believe that tables are not mostly empty 
space is not based solely on the visual seeming, but rather at least 
partly on other considerations, perhaps, for example, simplicity.  
 Put another way, the commonsense notion of solidity is 
something like having no visible holes, or impenetrable or resistant to 
transformation within some range of forces. A more sophisticated notion 
of solidity is that of having no holes whatsoever, visible or otherwise. 
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I take it that what we mean when we report that a table seems solid, 
on the basis of tactile or visual inspection, is that it seems solid in the 
ordinary sense of solidity. That the table is solid in the more 
sophisticated sense simply goes well beyond our visual or tactile 
evidence, since, as we know, a cloud of microparticles would feel and 
look just the way that a uniformly dense table would feel and look. 
Though, perhaps because the hypothesis is simpler and hence more 
attractive to minds predisposed toward simplicity, we may have 
once been inclined to believe that ordinary physical objects are 
uniformly dense on the basis of tactile and visual inspection, we 
unhesitatingly gave that up when science uncovered evidence that 
ordinary physical objects are actually composed of clouds of 
microparticles. Science delivered undercutting defeaters for our 
inclination to believe that ordinary physical objects are uniformly 
dense, on the basis of tactile or visual inspection. But this in no way 
impugns the integrity of our intellectual seemings. They simply 
weren’t involved. 
 Similar considerations apply, I think, to the case of the shape 
of the Earth. There may have been a point when, as a child, I looked 
at the horizon and falsely believed that the Earth was flat. But if I did, 
my belief was not based on an intellectual seeming – it’s not as 
though the proposition that the Earth is flat seemed true in the way 
that no prime minister is a prime number seems true. Nor, I think, was it 
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even based solely on the visual seeming. As we know, a flat Earth 
and an extremely large spherical Earth may look the same to one 
who stares off into the horizon. Whatever my visual experience of the 
shape of the Earth was while staring at the horizon as a child, it is not 
best described as seeming to be flat or seeming not to be spherical. No, it 
is rather that the Earth, upon viewing, failed to seem spherical.17 I 
was merely inclined to believe, perhaps for reasons of simplicity, that 
it was flat. In any event, these are not cases in which I formed false 
beliefs on the basis of intellectual seemings (nor even solely on visual 
seemings). And so neither these examples nor the numerous 
examples like them can furnish me with a defeater for my belief in 
Possibility and my belief in Non-Identity, beliefs which are both 
based solely on intellectual seemings.  
 Things are a bit trickier when it comes to water. Here, I think, 
one’s belief that it’s possible for a world to contain water but no H2O 
is based on an intellectual seeming. But this intellectual seeming is 
not misleading, despite the fact that water is necessarily identical 
with H2O. I will turn to this issue in the next section.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 I take it that Ludwig Wittgenstein made a similar point, in a discussion 
with G.E.M. Anscombe. Wittgenstein wondered aloud: “It’s always 
puzzled me why people believed that the Sun went around the Earth.” 
Anscombe replied: “Isn’t it obvious? It’s because it looks like the Sun goes 
around the Earth.” “And how would it look if the Earth went around the 
Sun?” Wittgenstein replied. 
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5.3 Unreliability with respect to a certain kind of intellectual seeming? 
 The previous section argued that we do not have a track 
record of widespread error when it comes to our beliefs based on 
intellectual seemings. So that consideration cannot furnish us with an 
undercutting defeater for our dualist intuitions. But suppose I 
examine the track record and learn that I am unreliable with respect 
to a certain kind of intellectual seeming. Suppose, for example, that 
when it comes to the mathematics of infinity, very many propositions 
that intellectually seem true to me are actually false. (For example, it 
occasionally strikes me as true that there are more natural numbers 
than even numbers. But this is false. And it occasionally strikes me 
that 1 is greater than the infinite decimal 0.999…. This too is false.) I 
may thereby gain a defeater for any belief I currently hold about the 
mathematics of infinity on the basis of an intellectual seeming. 
Similarly, suppose I examine the track record and learn that, when it 
comes to non-tautologous identity statements involving natural kind 
terms, very many propositions that intellectually seem true to me are 
actually false. I may thereby gain a defeater for any belief I currently 
hold about such identity statements on the basis of intellectual 
seemings. And this would include Possibility and Non-Identity. 
 Some philosophers believe that we are in this exact situation. 
For example, they say, water = H2O. And yet, they say, there is an 
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appearance of contingency here. It seems possible for water and H2O 
to come apart, and (so) they just seem different. And this holds 
generally with respect to non-tautologous identity statements 
involving natural kind terms. Therefore, they conclude, 
considerations like these furnish us with an undercutting defeater for 
many beliefs we hold regarding those kinds of identity statements. 




 What some report as the seeming possibility of a world with 
water but no H2O is, indeed, an intellectual seeming. But this 
intellectual seeming is not misleading; it is merely misreported. Let 
me explain.  
 The proposition that  
 (1) Water is H2O  
says of one natural kind–known as both “water” and “H2O”–that it is 
self-identical. If this is so, then since (1) is true it is necessarily true. 
The objector urges that in some sense (1) seems possibly false. That 
is, the objector urges that the following proposition seems possibly 
true: 
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(2) Water is not H2O 
But since (1) is necessarily true, (2) is necessarily false. And so the 
objector may conclude that when it comes to the modal status of 
identity claims involving natural kind terms, intellectual seemings 
are unreliable guides to truth. Since my belief in Possibility and Non-
Identity are based on intellectual seemings, the objector concludes 
that I have an undercutting defeater. 
 But I and many others think the objector suffers from 
proposition-confusion.18 She mistakenly takes the sentence “Water is 
H2O”to express something like one of these propositions:  
 (3) The watery stuff of our acquaintance is H2O 
 (4) “Water” and “H2O” corefer  
And these propositions seem possibly false. But (3) and (4) are indeed 
as they seem: they are (metaphysically) possibly false.  
 A person who thought that the sentence or utterance “Water 
is HeO” expresses (3) or (4) would likely issue the report that “it 
seems possible that water isn't H2O,” since of course (3) and (4) are 
contingent propositions. Perhaps such a person thinks that natural 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 This is, I take it, the common interpretation of Kripke. Others have 
followed. For example, Michael Tye (1986, 5) says “If…a man without 
scientific knowledge claims to be imagining that gold has atomic number 
8o (rather than its actual 79) what I think we would say he really 
imagines is that some substance with the superficial observable qualities 
of gold has atomic number 8o (rather than 79), and that is something 
quite different.” 
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kind terms merely abbreviate non-rigid definite descriptions, and so 
she thinks that the sentence “Water is H2O” expresses (3). What 
seems true to her isn’t that (1) is possibly false, but that (3) is possibly 
false.  
 Or perhaps the person is confusing word and object, and 
what seems true to her isn't that (1) is possibly false, but that (4) is 
possibly false. But in each case, then, intellectual seemings have not 
led this person astray. She has not erred with respect to the modal 
statuses of propositions. Rather, she is misunderstanding the 
semantics of the sentence, thinking that a sentence (namely “Water is 
H2O”) expresses a contingent proposition [namely (3) or (4)] when 
really it expresses a necessary proposition [namely (1)]. In each case, 
propositions have the modal status that they seem to have, and so we 
have no defeater for intellectual seemings generally. 
 To put it another way, Kripke did not teach us that certain 
propositions that appeared contingent were really necessary. He did 
not point out a modal illusion that we suffer from. Rather, Kripke 
taught us that proper names and natural kind terms function as rigid 
designators, not as disguised non-rigid definite descriptions. He 
drew our attention to certain sentences or utterances that we had 
thought expressed contingent propositions. Upon closer examination 
we came to see that proper names and natural kind terms are rigid 
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designators, and hence that these sentences or utterances express 
necessary propositions. Thus we are subject to a semantic illusion, not 
a modal illusion. But then this is not a case in which intellectual 
seemings have led us astray with respect to identity statements, and 
therefore this cannot be marshaled in support of non-dualists who 
claim that in the case of dualism we are suffering from a modal 
illusion.  
 So far, this is the standard Kripkean story about proposition 
confusion. Not all philosophers have found this convincing. For 
example, Scott Soames (2006) argues against what he calls the 
Coherent Conceivability Thesis,19 which goes roughly like so:  
Apart from confusion about what we are conceiving, coherent 
conceivability is a reliable guide to genuine (metaphysical) 
possibility. If we can coherently conceive – without confusion 
of the sort discussed earlier in this section -- of a world in 
which p is true, then there are genuine (metaphysically) 
possible worlds in which p is true. 
If Soames is right, then the dualist may still be on the hook. For, as 
Soames would have it, it may still be that we shouldn’t trust our 
intuitions when it comes to identity claims involving rigid 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19
 As I say, the Methodological Argument I am considering eschews talk of 
conceivability in favor of intellectual seemings. Soames, however, targets 
conceivability. In what follows, I will reconstrue Soames’ criticisms so that they 
apply to the Methodological Argument. 
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designators, even if we take care to avoid confusing rigid designators 
with their associated reference-fixing descriptions. There may be 
other confusions that one could make, according to Soames, 
confusions we are in fact apt to make. This would spell trouble for 
our dualist intuitions. 
 Soames’ argument against the Coherent Conceivability Thesis 
goes as follows. He shows that it is inconsistent with a widely-
accepted Kripkean thesis about the essentiality of origins for material 
objects. Soames asks us to consider this sentence: 
(Sperm&Egg) “I came from a sperm and an egg (if I exist at 
all).” 
In uttering this sentence, Soames says, I identify the referent of ‘I’ 
directly, without detour through nonrigid descriptions. Hence, no 
confusion of rigid designator with nonrigid reference-fixing 
descriptions threatens. If the Coherent Conceivability Thesis were 
correct, this should make for a close connection between apparent 
possibility and genuine possibility. But, according to Soames, it 
doesn’t. Though the proposition I use the sentence (Sperm&Egg) to 
entertain and assert is (assuming Kripke’s own essentiality of origin 
thesis, according to Soames) necessary, a world in which I do not 
come from a sperm and egg is apparently possible. Thus, we have a 
counterexample to the Coherent Conceivability Thesis: an example of 
 29!
a proposition that is apparently possible yet genuinely impossible, 
and this failure in our modal intuitions cannot be chalked up to a 
confusion between rigid designators and nonrigid reference fixing 
descriptions. 
 Of course, this objection assumes that I am identical with (or 
otherwise necessarily connected with) my body, i.e. that material 
object with origins in a sperm and egg. Given the necessity of 
identity and Kripke’s essentiality of origins thesis, it would follow 
that I could not have existed but with origins in a sperm and an egg.  
Naturally, many dualists will not accept this assumption. In fact, they 
may take the apparent possibility of a world in which one does not 
have his or her origins in a sperm and an egg as a compelling 
argument against the view that one is identical with (or otherwise 
necessarily connected with) one’s body or brain. 
 But Soames’ argument can be recast using a different kind of 
rigid designator, a demonstrative like “that.” Consider this sentence: 
(Table) “That (pointing to the wooden table before me) came 
from wood.” 
A revised argument might go as follows: There is an apparently 
possible world in which the proposition expressed by (Table) is false. 
Yet it is necessarily true since it is actually true and Kripke’s 
essentially of origins thesis is correct. And in this case the 
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demonstrative “that” refers directly, not via a nonrigid reference-
fixing description. Therefore, the Coherent Conceivability Thesis is 
false.  
 I do not find this argument compelling. Three replies suggest 
themselves. First, I confess that a world in which that (i.e. the wooden 
table) did not come from wood does not strike me as apparently 
possible. I take it I’m not alone in this, and this is why Kripke chose a 
wooden table as his example when motivating the essentiality of 
origins thesis. So the first premise of the revised argument is false. 
Soames’ premise might be more plausible if one were ignorant of the 
table’s composition. Even then, however, it would not strike me as 
apparently possible that this (pointing to the table before me) might 
not have come from wood. I would be agnostic on the question. 
 Secondly, if one accepts that material objects can survive a 
complete replacement of their parts, then there are good grounds to 
suppose that Kripke’s essentiality of origins thesis is false. David 
Barnett (2005 and ms.) gives counterexamples to both the claim that 
material objects have their origins essentially in the hunk of matter 
they actually came from, and also the claim that material objects have 
their origins essentially in the type of substance that they actually 
came from. The second kind of counterexample suffices to refute 
both claims. One such counterexample goes roughly like this. Call 
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this table before me Tab. Suppose Tab has n number of wooden parts. 
Suppose further that, prior to having been assembled into a table, 
Tab’s n building blocks had undergone gradual and complete 
replacements of their original wood with plastic. The same carpenter 
who built Tab had then assembled the very same n building blocks, 
according to the very same plan, at the very same time, into a table. 
Intuitively, Barnett says, the carpenter would have built Tab. (Of 
course, only people who believe that material objects can survive 
complete part replacement will find this intuitively attractive. I am 
not among those people.) If Barnett is right, then Kripke’s essentiality 
of origins thesis is false and so the revised argument inspired by 
Soames will fail. 
 Finally, consider the claim that in the sentence (Table) the 
demonstrative “that” refers directly. Whatever it means for “that” to 
refer directly, it must be consistent with the fact that demonstratives 
have modes of presentation attached with each deployment. That is, 
whenever we deploy a demonstrative, there is in fact some nonrigid 
description that we associate with the demonstrative. Perhaps the 
demonstrative does not refer via the description, whatever that might 
mean. But there is no doubt that the description exists and could 
easily be called to the mind of whomever deploys the demonstrative. 
In the case of (Table), the nonrigid description we associate with 
“that” is something like “the table before me, having such and such 
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manifest properties.” But such a description is poised to be confused 
with the rigid designator “that” in the same way that we are apt to 
confuse “Hesperus” for “the evening star.” But then we will not here 
have a counterexample to the Coherent Conceivability Thesis, since 
we will not have a case of an impossibility the coherent 
conceivability of which cannot be explained as an instance of 
proposition confusion. And thus the revised argument against our 
dualist intuitions fails. In conclusion, then, the prima facie 
justification of Possibility and Non-Identity remains undefeated.  
 
5.5. Fallacious operator shifts, perhaps? 
 René  Descartes claimed to see, “clearly and distinctly,” that 
his essence did not include spatial extension, and so that he—in 
contrast to his body—could exist while no material objects existed. 
Antoine Arnauld suggested that perhaps Descartes was suffering 
from a failure of imagination or rational insight. Perhaps, Arnauld 
thought, it wasn't that Descartes clearly saw that his essence did not 
include spatial extension, but rather that he failed to see that it did. 
And so, perhaps it was not that Descartes clearly saw the possibility 
of his existing while no material objects exist, but rather that he 
merely failed to see the impossibility. By way of example, Arnauld 
pointed out (in Descartes 1984, 141-2) that one may see for certain 
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that the angle in a semi-circle is a right angle, and yet may doubt, or 
not be certain, or not understand that the square on the hypotenuse is 
equal to the squares on the other two sides. And yet it does not 
follow that having the square of the hypotenuse equal to the squares 
of the other two sides is not essential to this right triangle. I take the 
suggestion from Arnauld to be that Descartes may have been the 
victim of a fallacious operator shift, moving hastily from the truth 
that p does not seem impossible to the conclusion that p seems possible. 
 Michael Tye (1986) offers a similar suggestion:  
Where I suggest we go wrong in our thought experiments is 
in the belief that if it seems to us that we have imagined 
things A, B, C, . . . occurring together in some possible world 
Wn it automatically follows that we have really done so. 
…[W]e may have succeeded in imagining all of A, B, C,... but 
not together in a single possible world   
Tye’s worry, I take it, is that one may mistake the possibility of A and 
the possibility of B for the possibility of A&B, thereby committing an 
elementary modal fallacy. 
 Similar concerns can be urged against Possibility and Non-
Identity. For Possibility, an Arnauldian proposal would be that 
perhaps we mistake our failure to see the impossibility of this 
without that for successfully seeing the possibility of that state of 
affairs. And Tye’s suggestion would be that perhaps we mistake our 
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seeing that a possible world includes this and another possible world 
doesn’t include that for seeing that a single possible world includes 
this but not that.  
 As for Non-Identity, a non-dualist who takes this line has two 
options. She could say that, after fallaciously inferring Possibility, the 
dualist goes on to validly infer Non-Identity. Or, the non-dualist 
could say that perhaps Non-Identity is itself the product of a 
fallacious operator shift. David Armstrong (1968, 48-49) puts the 
proposal this way: “It can… be suggested by the Materialist that we 
tend to pass from something that is true: I am not introspectively aware 
that mental images are brain processes to something that is false: I am 
introspectively aware that mental images are not brain processes.”  
 And so perhaps, as these authors suggest, I am the victim of 
some fallacious operator shift, hastily passing from the proposition 
that I can’t see that p is impossible to the proposition that I can see that p 
is possible, or from the proposition that I can see that p is possible and 
that q is possible to the proposition that I can see that (p&q) is possible, or 
from the proposition that I am not aware that p to the proposition that 
I am aware that not-p. The question before us is, do any of these 
proposals furnish us with an undercutting defeater for our dualist 
intuitions?  
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5.6. Response 
 No, these suggestions do not provide any undercutting 
defeaters for Possibility and Non-Identity, for two reasons. First, 
merely pointing out the possibility of a fallacious operator shift – i.e. 
merely suggesting that this occurs – is not in general sufficient to 
undercut beliefs held on the basis of intellectual seemings. That type 
of consideration does not in general entail that a subject cannot 
rationally persist in her belief. And so these proposals fail to meet the 
necessary condition on undercutting defeat mentioned above.  
 Consider the seeming truth of the proposition that the Prime 
Minister is not a prime number. What could be more obvious than 
that? But now consider this suggestion from a niggling skeptic: “You 
mistake failing to see that the Prime Minister is a prime number for 
successfully seeing that he isn’t.” Surely this bare possibility–this 
unsubstantiated suggestion–does not defeat your belief that the 
Prime Minister is not a prime number.  
 Secondly, if the mere possiblity of a fallacious operator shift 
were sufficient to defeat intellectual seemings, then all of our beliefs 
based on intellectual seemings would be undercut, including 
Arnauld’s, Tye’s, and Armstrong’s beliefs that the operator shifts 
they mention are fallacious. After all, for example, Tye may 
unconsciously mistake his failure to see the validity of 
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((!p&!q)"!(p&q)) for successfully seeing its invalidity. But if those 
beliefs are undercut, i.e. if neither they nor we can justifiably believe 
that these operator shifts are as fallacious as they seem, then their 
proposals lose all force. 
 And so it seems perfectly rational to persist in believing 
Possibility and Non-Identity on the basis of their seeming truth, even 
upon gaining the belief that this seeming may be the result of an 
unconscious fallacious operator shift. Things would be much 
different if we had solid empirical data that we actually are victims of 
a subconscious fallacious operator shift. But, as the proposals stand, 
they do not provide us with an undercutting defeater for the seeming 
truth of Possibility and Non-Identity. So let us now turn to the next 
proposal for an undercutting defeater. 
 
5.7. Dual-Process Cognition 
 In a forthcoming paper, Fiala et al. propose that our dualist 
intuitions arise from dual-process cognition. In contrast to the 
previously discussed suggestions, this proposal actually has 
substantial empirical evidence in its favor. The idea is that humans 
have a “low-road” cognitive process for attributing mental states. 
This process is quick, automatic, unconscious, associative, heuristic-
based, computationally simple, evolutionarily old, domain-specific 
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and non-inferential. It is triggered by simple, surface level features, 
e.g. having eyes, appearing to behave in a contingently interactive 
manner, and displaying distinctive (non-inertial) motion trajectories. 
In addition to this “low-road” process, humans come equipped with 
a “high-road” cognitive process for attributing mental states. This 
process is relatively slow, controlled, introspectively accessible, rule-
based, analytic, computationally demanding, inferential, domain-
general, and voluntary.  
 Usually, these two processes issue harmonious verdicts. 
However, this is not so in dualist thought experiments, according to 
Fiala et al. In dualist thought experiments, we consider the mass of 
gray matter that composes the human brain. If we are non-dualists, 
we might deduce from our internalized theoretical beliefs that the 
right kind of naturalistically-acceptable state type is also a certain 
type of conscious experience. Or, if we are dualists, we presumably 
use this high-road cognitive process merely to entertain the 
hypothesis that a certain kind of naturalistically-acceptable state type 
is a certain kind of conscious experience.  
 At the same time, our low-road cognitive process does not 
issue the verdict that a certain kind of brain state is a conscious 
experience, since we do not categorize the eye-less, behavior-less, 
motionless brain as an agent. This low-road cognitive process fails to 
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make any attributions of consciousness; it is just silent on the 
question. We fail to have a quick, automatic ‘gut-feeling’ that the 
reductive state type in question is a certain type of conscious 
experience. But it would be hasty to conclude on this basis that 
Possibility is true: from a failure for type X to seem identical with 
type Y, it hardly follows that X and Y are not necessarily 
coextensional. Neither should we conclude on this basis that Non-
Identity is true: from the fact that type X fails to seem like type Y it 
doesn’t follow that X is not identical with Y.  
Let’s grant that this is all correct: we do have these two 
processes for attributing mental states, and only one is active during 
standard dualist thought experiments. Would it follow that we have 
an undercutting defeater for our dualist intuitions? 
 
5.8. Response 
 No, it would not follow. The proposal overgenerates 
defeaters. If this suggestion from Fiala et al. required that we be 
suspicious of our dualist intuitions, it would also require that we be 
suspicious of perfectly mundane intuitions that we know are above 
reproach. For example, I look down and notice that a couple of my 
floorboards are misaligned. I consider the proposition that being a 
misaligned floorboard is identical with the feeling of pain. I 
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immediately dismiss the suggestion out of hand. Of course the 
property of being a misalingned floorboard is  not identical with 
pain: the two properties are not coextensive, and they are just 
obviously non-identical. These ‘dualist’ intuitions, I take it, are 
completely above board. We should not be suspicious of them. 
 However, whatever disharmony occurs between my dual 
cognitive processes in the standard dualist thought experiments also 
occurs in the case of the misaligned floorboards. My high-road 
cognitive processes entertains a certain identity claim: being a 
misaligned floorboard just is pain. My low-road cognitive process 
does not consider the eye-less, behavior-less, motionless floorboards 
to be agents. That low-road process therefore does not attribute 
consciousness to the floorboards. If this type of disharmony between 
my dual cognitive processes is sufficient to undercut my dualist 
intuitions, it should also undercut my floorboard intuitions. But since 
I can clearly rationally persist in my belief that misaligned 
floorboards are not conscious, this proposal from Fiala et al. does not 
undercut my dualist intuitions. 
 This suggests that there is more to the story that Fiala et al. 
recognize. Perhaps I have some other cognitive process that issues 
verdicts about what types of states could not be conscious states. For 
all Fiala et al. tell us, this third process might be perfectly reliable, 
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and it may be operative in the case of the floorboards and also in the 
standard dualist thought experiments. 
 
5.9. Duped by our concepts? 
 Let’s now discuss what I believe to be the most popular and 
plausible attempt to undercut dualist intuitions. Many philosophers 
think that reflection on the concepts that figure in Possibility and 
Non-Identity will furnish us with an undercutting defeater for each.20 
These philosophers typically claim that the culprit is a lack of a priori 
entailment relations between some relevant concepts. Typically, they 
say that there are no substantive a priori ties between our 
phenomenal and physical (or physiological) concepts. That is, there 
are no non-tautalogous a priori knowable inferences from thoughts 
containing phenomenal concepts to thoughts containing physical (or 
physiological) concepts, and vice versa. You will find this thought in 
Block (2006, 53), Hill (1996, 75), Loar (2003, 115-6), Nagel (1998, §4), 
Papineau (2002, 87), Tye (1999, 715), and many others.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 In what follows, the philosophers I discuss typically do not construe 
dualist intuitions as crucially involving only demonstrative concepts like 
THIS and THAT. However, I believe that they would mean what they 
say about specifically phenomenal and physical concepts – like PAIN 
and C-FIBERS FIRING – to apply, for even stronger reasons, to stripped 
down demonstrative concepts. 
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 So the suggestion is that the concepts that figure crucially into 
Possibility and Non-Identity are, from the armchair at least, really 
just silent with respect to each other. It is not Possibility itself that 
intellectually seems true. Rather, we really only fail to see the 
impossibility of this without that. And it is not Non-Identity itself that 
intellectually seems true. Rather, we really only fail to see that this is 
identical with that. And of course, as Arnauld and Armstrong 
pointed out, these are bad grounds on which to believe Possibility 
and Non-Identity. 
 Now, in order to improve on the mere suggestions from 
Arnauld and Armstrong, and in order actually get an undercutting 
defeater, it must be the case that, in the dualist thought experiment, 
we are in fact (and not merely possibly) disposed to believe dualism 
on these poor grounds. This, I take it, is why Nagel (1998, §4) says 
that “our concepts fail to reveal a necessary connection, and we are 
tempted to conclude to the absence of any such connection.” 
Elaborating on Nagel’s proposal, Hill (1996, 75-8) asserts that we are 
in fact endowed with an unreliable psychological mechanism the 
function of which is to churn out the belief that the referents of any 
two concepts C1 and C2 could come apart, whenever there are 
merely no substantive a priori ties between C1 and C2 (and no 
immediately accessible sufficient a posteriori reasons to think that C1 
and C2 corefer). 
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 I interpret Nagel and Hill as asserting something like the 
following: 
(5) For any concepts C1 and C2 and normal human subject S, 
if C1 and C2 have no substantive a priori ties, and if S 
lacks sufficient a posteriori reason to think C1 and C2 
corefer, then it won’t intellectually seem metaphysically 
impossible to S for the referents of C1 and C2 to come 
apart, and it will seem to S on this basis that it’s 
metaphysically possible for the referents of C1 and C2 to 
come apart. 
If (5) is true, and if its antecedent is met, then the seeming truth of 
dualism is not a reliable indicator of or does not warrant belief in its 
actual truth. It would be false that dualism wouldn’t seem true 
unless it were true. This proposal, therefore, would give us an 
undercutting defeater for Possibility (and Non-Identity, which, 
presumably on this view, we infer from Possibility). However, if (5) 
is false, then this proposal fails to deliver an undercutting defeater. 
 
5.10. Response 
 The proposal rests on the assumption that (5) is true. 
However, (5) is false, and so this proposal fails to deliver an 
undercutting defeater. The second “seem” in the consequent of (5) 
may refer to an intellectual seeming, or it may refer to a disposition 
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to believe. Here’s a counterexample to (5) on both interpretations:  
Something somewhere is named “Chomolungma,” but I am not 
telling you what or where it is. You now have the concept 
CHOMOLUNGMA in your cognitive economy. CHOMOLUNGMA 
has no substantive a priori entailment relations with your concept 
MOUNT EVEREST, and you lack sufficient a posteriori reason to 
think that C1 and C2 corefer.  
 So, in this case, the antecedent of (5) is met, and we are 
halfway to a counterexample. How about the consequent? It certainly 
doesn’t intellectually seem metaphysically impossible for their 
referents to come apart, as (5) predicts. Yet, importantly, neither does 
it intellectually seem metaphysically possible for the referents to come 
apart. After all, if it really intellectually seemed metaphysically 
possible for the referents to come apart, then it would intellectually 
seem that the referents are distinct (since actual identity clearly 
entails necessary identity). But obviously it doesn’t seem so. Nor are 
you inclined to judge that it is possible for the referents to come 
apart. You are just agnostic about the identity claim – neither it nor 
its negation strikes you as obviously true, and you are not inclined to 
believe either. And so (5) is false no matter how we take the verb “to 
seem” in the consequent.  
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 Also, (5) overgenerates undercutting defeaters, and this is an 
additional reason to believe it is false. Nagel’s and Hill’s proposal 
would have us be suspicious of some intuitions of distinctness that 
we know we should not be suspicious of. For example, consider your 
phenomenal concept of pain and your physiological concept of 
angiogenesis. (Angiogenesis is the formation and development of 
blood vessels.) I take it to be obvious that the felt quality type of pain 
is not (and metaphysically could not be) the formation of blood 
vessels (that event-type). Clearly and uncontroversially, something 
could be a token of one type without being a token of the other.  
 But, if Nagel and Hill are right about phenomenal and 
physiological concepts, these two concepts have no substantive a 
priori entailment relations between them. If (5) is true, then I should 
be suspicious of my belief that the felt quality type of pain is not the 
formation of blood vessels (that event-type), since, on these 
suppositions, it would seem metaphysically possible for pain and 
angiogenesis to come apart whether or not it were metaphysically 
possible. But clearly I shouldn’t be suspicious of that intuition. So this 
proposal overgenerates undercutting defeaters, and so we shouldn’t 
accept the proposal. 
I see no reason in the neighborhood other than (5) to think 
that actually, our belief in Possibility and Non-Identity is based on 
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bad grounds. And recall from the discussion of Arnauld, Tye, and 
Armstrong that it is insufficient to point out merely that possibly our 
belief in Possibility and Non-Identity is based on bad grounds. So I 
conclude that, as it stands, Nagel and Hill offer us no undercutting 
defeater.  
Furthermore, Nagel and Hill provide us with an undercutting 
defeater only if the antecedent of (5) is met. But there are good 
reasons to think that the antecedent of (5) is not met, since there are 
good reasons to believe that there are substantive a priori ties 
between phenomenal and physical (or physiological) concepts, and 
specifically between THIS and THAT as deployed in the 
autocerebroscope case. Consider Non-Identity itself, and some of its 
cousins. Non-Identity is a substantive a priori entailment relation 
between THIS and THAT (as deployed during the autocerebroscope 
case), and the intuition persists even if we swap out the 
demonstrative concepts for non-demonstrative phenomenal and 
physical (or physiological) concepts. So there’s one reason to believe 
that the antecedent of (5) isn’t met, and therefore that Nagel and Hill 
do not provide us with an undercutting defeater. 
Also, if there are no substantive a priori entailment relations 
between any two concepts C1 and C2 for some subject S, then it 
won’t seem metaphysically impossible to S for the referents of C1 
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and C2 to come apart, but it also won’t seem metaphysically 
impossible to S that the referents be identical. (Consider 
CHOMOLUNGMA and MOUNT EVEREST again.) Yet in the dualist 
thought experiment, it does seem metaphysically impossible that the 
referents of THIS and THAT be identical (since their referents seem 
actually distinct and actual distinctness clearly entails necessary 
distinctness).  
Finally, if there are no substantive a priori entailment 
relations between any two concepts C1 and C2 for some normal 
human subject S, then sufficient empirical information will lead S to 
believe with no compunction that C1 and C2 corefer. For example, if 
I gave you reason to believe that CHOMOLUNGMA does refer to 
Mount Everest, then you would have no problem believing that the 
relevant concepts corefer. However, no amount of the relevant 
empirical information closes the explanatory gap in the philosophy 
of mind – dualist intuitions persist, even in light of all the relevant 
empirical data. As Papineau (2002, 161) says: “even given all the 
arguments, intuition continues to object to mind-brain identity.” And 
Tye (1999, 706) says that the explanatory gap remains open “even for 
those who understand full well the relevant phenomenal terms and 
who know the underlying physical and functional story.” Therefore, 
again, the antecedent of (5) isn’t met, and therefore Nagel and Hill do 
not provide us with an undercutting defeater. 
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As it stands, then, Nagel fails to deliver an undercutting 
defeater. I will now leave Nagel and Hill behind, and move to 
another type of proposal for an undercutting defeater from Thomas 
Polger. 
 
5.11. Insufficient Grasp of Relevant Concepts? 
 Thomas Polger (2004, 49ff) offers a similar account of our 
dualist intuitions, which he believes are misleading. According to 
Polger, the culprit is our insufficient grasp of the identity conditions 
of brain states. Polger thinks that we have, in an important way, 
failed to fully grasp the concept of a brain state, since we do not 
know the identity conditions of brain states. And he thinks that, in 
general, if we are uninformed about the identity conditions of either 
Xs or Ys, then even if they are identical it might seem that they could 
come apart. “Thus arises the appearance of contingency,” he says. 
This is a conceptual failure on our part. Our anemic grasp of the 
concept of a brain state causes us to deem them candidates for 
identity with phenomenal states, and may cause the relevant identity 
claim to appear contingent even if it isn’t. 
 This proposal bears a family resemblance to the previous 
proposal. The idea, I take it, is that our concept of a brain state is 
really just silent with respect to our phenomenal concepts. Since we 
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don’t fully grasp the identity conditions of brain states, we fail to see 
that they just are phenomenal states. And, Polger believes, dualists 
mistake their failure to see that brain states are phenomenal states for 
successfully seeing that they are not. This idea has something to be 
said for it, as Polger illustrates with the example of Thingamajigs and 
Whatchamacallits. If – as suggested by their names – you are unclear 
on the nature of Thingamajigs and Whatchamacallits, you may 
mistake the epistemic possibility of their distinctness for the 
metaphysical possibility. You may mistake, that is, your inability to 
rule out their distinctness for your ability to rule it in. This is a 
tempting slip, at least in the case of Thingamajigs and 
Whatchamacallits. And perhaps we are making the same mistake 
when it comes to dualism. If we learn that we are making this 
mistake, this would successfully undercut our dualist intuitions. 
 
5.12. Response 
 There are at least two reasons to think that we’re not making 
this mistake when it comes to our dualist intuitions, however. As 
with the proposal from Nagel et al., Polger’s proposal overgenerates 
undercutting defeaters. We hold many beliefs about brain states that 
are obvious, uncontroversial, and based on intellectual seemings, and 
yet which would fall under a cloud of suspicion were Polger correct. 
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Therefore, Polger is not correct. For example, I take it we all believe 
that brain states are not numbers, and that brain states are not 
earthquakes. But according to Polger we are in the dark about the 
identity conditions of brain states and so we are at risk of mistaking 
our inability to see the truth of identity claims involving brain states 
for our ability to see their falsity. It would follow that even a belief as 
obvious and uncontroversial as that brain states are not earthquakes 
is undercut, on Polger’s view. But since that belief is clearly above 
reproach, something must have gone wrong with Polger’s proposal. 
 Polger may reply that we are not completely in the dark when 
it comes to the identity conditions of brain states. We know enough 
about their identity conditions to see that brain states are not 
earthquakes or numbers, but not enough to see that brain states are 
not phenomenal states. This is a promising line, but Polger needs to 
say more to support this claim. How might we distinguish between 
earthquakes and phenomenal states in a principled way, so it comes 
out that we know enough about brain states to rule out identity with 
earthquakes and not phenomenal states? Unless he answers that 
question, Polger’s proposal does not provide us with an undercutting 
defeater for our dualist intuitions. 
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 Polger’s revised proposal might go like this.21 What we fail to 
grasp is the fundamental nature of physical matter. We know how 
matter functions, what sort of relations it enters into, both at the 
fundamental level and in aggregate. This is how we know brain 
states aren’t earthquakes: we know that an aggregate of matter that 
could function as an earthquake could not (or at least would not) 
function as a brain state. We could then supplement the suggestion 
that consciousness does not seem to have a functional or relational 
nature. And it might be that, whenever we entertain two concepts C1 
and C2, if C1 is a concept of a thing of which we understand only the 
function, and C2 is a concept of a thing of which we understand only 
the intrinsic nature, it might seem that C1 and C2 could fail to corefer 
even if they couldn’t. Finally, one might add that this consequence is 
sufficient to undercut any intellectual seeming that C1 and C2 could 
come apart. This would avoid the brain states and earthquakes 
objection while still promising an undercutting defeater for our 
dualist intuitions. 
 However, this proposal still faces difficulty. I take it as 
obvious that earthquakes are not and could not be phenomenal 
states. And I take it that if our concept of a brain state is a concept of 
a thing of which we understand only the function, the same goes 
with our concept of an earthquake. And so in considering the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21
 I owe this suggestion to David Barnett, though I may not be doing it justice. 
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identity claim “earthquakes are phenomenal states” I deploy two 
concepts. One (the concept of an earthquake) is the concept of a thing 
of which we understand only the function, and the other is a concept 
of a thing of which we understand only the intrinsic nature. It would 
follow on the revised proposal, then, that we have an undercutting 
defeater for our belief that earthquakes are not phenomenal states. 
This is an unhappy result, and examples could be multiplied. So, this 
revised proposal overgenerates defeaters and ought to be rejected. 
 There is a second problem with Polger’s proposal, both in the 
original form and the revised form. Consider again his Thingamajigs 
and Whatchamacallits example. Since we are clueless about the 
identity conditions of these things, we may feel a pull toward 
thinking that they are possibly distinct. But note well that we feel an 
equally strong pull toward thinking that they are possibly identical. If 
we were to say “Maybe they’re identical, but maybe they’re not,” 
we’d be reporting epistemic possibilities, i.e. our inability to rule out 
their identity as well as our ability to rule out their non-identity.  
 And so, if we are in the same boat with respect to our concept 
of a brain state, then we should be just as tempted to conclude in 
dualist thought experiments that brain states are identical with 
phenomenal states as we are to conclude that they are distinct. They 
should be candidates for identity as well as candidates for 
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distinctness. But we are not tempted in that way. Brain states seem 
like the wrong kind of thing to be conscious states. And so Polger’s 
proposal does not capture the data; it issues a prediction that is 
falsified by the data. And so I again conclude that Polger fails to 
provide us with an undercutting defeater for our dualist intuitions. 
Let’s now turn to a final proposed undercutting defeater, from David 
Papineau.  
 
5.13. Papineau’s Proposal 
 Papineau's strategy for undercutting our dualist intuitions 
goes like this: call the way in which we think about the phenomenal 
character of pain from the inside a phenomenal concept. (I’ll use 
“PAINp” to refer to that phenomenal concept.) When we think about 
conscious experiences in this phenomenal way, when we “deploy” or 
“exercise” phenomenal concepts, the concepts themselves exemplify 
or stimulate versions of their respective conscious states, according to 
Papineau. So when we think about pain in a phenomenal way, when 
we deploy PAINp imaginatively, Papineau (2002, 170) says that “we 
activate a ‘faint copy’ of the experience referred to. When we deploy 
a phenomenal concept introspectively, we amplify the experience 
referred to into a ‘vivid copy’ of itself.”  
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 Non-phenomenal concepts, on the other hand, do not do this, 
and so we feel that non-phenomenal concepts “leave out” the 
feelings themselves. However, the mere fact that non-phenomenal 
concepts “leave out” these faint or vivid copies does not for a 
moment suggest that they do not refer to sensations. My non-
phenomenal concept C-FIBERS FIRING and my phenomenal concept 
PAINp may still corefer, even though the former “leaves out” the 
phenomenology that the latter activates. Similarly, the concepts 
LAUGHING GAS and N2O may corefer (in fact they do), even if that 
seems incredible since these concepts activate radically different 
mental images in us. 
 According to Papineau, we succumb to the fallacy of thinking 
that the reason Possibility and Non-Identity seem true has anything 
to do with the referents of our concepts. Rather, he says, we are 
committing a use-mention fallacy. A third-person, non-phenomenal 
way of thinking might not use conscious experiences in the way that 
a first-person, phenomenal way of thinking does. But this fact does 
not imply that the non-phenomenal concept does not mention the 
same thing that the phenomenal concept does. So although it may 
seem to us that Possibility and Non-Identity are true, this in no way 
warrants belief in the truth of Possibility and Non-Identity since the 
seeming is caused by facts about our concepts, not by facts out there 
in the world. Possibility and Non-Identity would seem true whether 
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or not they were true. We are being fooled by a contingent feature of 




 Let’s think about Papineau’s argument for the conclusion that 
we have an undercutting defeater in the case of Possibility and Non-
Identity. First, Papineau asserts this (true) proposition: 
(6) For normal human subjects, deployment of non-
phenomenal concepts “leaves out” something that 
deployment of non-phenomenal concepts doesn’t.!
In addition, Papineau points out the following truth: 
(7) For any concepts C1 and C2, and subject S, the fact that S’s 
deployment of C1 “leaves out” something that S’s deployment 
of C2 doesn’t does not render probable or warrant belief 
that C1 and C2 are not necessarily coextensional (and 
therefore have distinct referents) for S.  
So Papineau points out a bad basis on which one might judge the 
truth of Possibility and Non-Identity, namely this contingent feature 
on our concepts. However, in order to provide an undercutting 
defeater, Papineau must give us some reason to think that it is not 
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merely possible that Possibility and Non-Identity seem true on this 
bad basis, but that they actually do. Here's an unpromising strategy: 
(8) For any concepts C1 and C2, and normal human subject S, 
if S’s deployment of C1 “leaves out” something that S’s 
deployment of C2 does not, then it will seem true to S on 
this basis that C1 and C2 are not necessarily coextensional 
and have distinct referents. 
If true, (8) would [in combination with (6) and (7)] furnish us withan 
undercutting defeater, a reason to think that the basis on which we 
judge Possibility and Non-Identity to be true does not warrant belief 
in Possibility or Non-Identity.  
 However, this strategy overgenerates undercutting defeaters, 
i.e. it gives us reason to doubt the seeming truth of propositions that 
we rightly take to be indubitable. For example, suppose my friend, 
hung up on Ockham's razor and seeking to scale down his ontology, 
proposes that the felt quality type of pain is identical with the felt 
quality type of euphoria. I consider the identity, deploying the 
relevant phenomenal concepts. Deployment of each concept “leaves 
out” something that deployment of the other does not. And it seems 
obviously true to me that the referents are distinct and not 
necessarily coextensional. But, if (8) is true, I should be suspicious of 
this seeming. After all, if, as it says, distinctness of referent and non-
necessary coextension will seem true on a bad basis (viz. a contingent 
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feature of the concepts), then I ought to refrain from judging that 
things are as they seem. But clearly this judgment is not suspicious – 
it is as obviously true as anything can be. Therefore (8) overgenerates 
defeaters, and so it’s false. There must be some other basis on which I 
non-fallaciously judge distinctness and non-necessary coextension. 
 (8) is also plagued by straightforward counterexamples. 
Suppose I overhear some friends discussing Smith's favorite color. I 
don't know what color they're referring to, but I submit to the urge to 
name it “Colin.” I then wonder “Is Colin identical with red?” In 
considering the identity, I deploy my phenomenal concept of red and 
my new non-phenomenal concept of Colin. Deployment of the latter 
concept leaves out something (a “faint copy” of red) that deployment 
of the former concept does not. And yet it doesn’t at all seem to me 
that the referents are distinct or not necessarily coextensional; I'm 
agnostic on the question. Therefore, (8) is false, and – as it stands – 
Papineau fails to provide us with an undercutting defeater. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In conclusion, if you share the widespread intuition that 
Possibility and Non-Identity are true, then your prima facie 
justification is so far undefeated. You may find fault in the arguments 
of this paper, or you may know of undercutting defeaters that I do 
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not discuss and that you take to be compelling. In the following 
chapter, I will discuss the prospects of an undercutting defeater from 
the fact that there is widespread disagreement on this issue among 
epistemic peers. Or, you may have access to a rebutting defeater 
sufficient to neutralize or override the justification you currently 
enjoy in favor of dualism. Otherwise, you ought to believe dualism. 





The Equal-Weight View Does Not Defeat Dualist 
Intuitions 
 
Some philosophers believe that when epistemic peers disagree, each 
has an obligation to accord the other’s assessment the same weight as 
her own. Call this “the Equal-Weight View” of peer disagreement. 
When it comes to the philosophy of mind, one might think that the 
quality and quantity of disagreement among philosophers might 
furnish us with a defeater for the apparent truth of dualism. In this 
chapter, I will show that this is not so.  If a subject believes dualism 
on the basis of its striking truth in the standard thought experiments, 
then the Equal-Weight View of peer disagreement will not require 
the subject to diminish her confidence in dualism.  
I first make the antecedent of this Equal-Weight View precise, 
and then motivate the View by describing cases in which it gives the 
intuitively correct verdict. Next I introduce some apparent 
counterexamples – cases of apparent peer disagreement in which, 
intuitively, one should not give equal weight to the other party’s 
assessment. To defuse these apparent counterexamples, an advocate 
of the View might try to explain how they are not genuine cases of 
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peer disagreement. I examine David Christensen’s and Adam Elga’s 
explanations and find them wanting. I then offer a novel explanation, 
which turns on a distinction between knowledge from reports and 
knowledge from direct acquaintance. Then, I extend my explanation 
to provide a handy and satisfying response to the charge of self-
defeat. Finally, I extend my explanation to the case of dualist 
intuitions, and show how the Equal-Weight View will not 
recommend that the dualist give equal weight to the view of a 
disagreeing epistemic peer. 
 
The Equal-Weight View 
Some philosophers believe that when epistemic peers disagree, 
each has an obligation to accord the other’s assessment the same 
weight as her own. Call this “the Equal-Weight View.” Recent 
advocates include Adam Elga (2007), Richard Feldman (2006), and 
David Christensen (2007). Elga puts his general view of disagreement 
this way: 
Your probability in a given disputed claim should equal your 
prior conditional probability in that claim. Prior to what? 
Prior to your thinking through the claim, and finding out 
what your advisor thinks of it. Conditional on what? On 
whatever you have learned about the circumstances of how 
you and your advisor have evaluated the claim. (500, n. 26) 
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The “prior” here needn’t be temporal priority. Elga clarifies 
elsewhere (489-90) that your credence in a disputed claim should 
equal your conditional probability in that claim setting aside “your 
detailed reasoning (and what you know of your friend’s reasoning) 
about the disputed issue.” That is, you are meant to conditionalize on 
a proper subset of your evidence – a subset which includes what you 
know of the circumstances of disagreement, but excludes the 
particular contents of your assessments and any reasoning by which 
you arrived at them.  
Let me now carefully describe a case of peer disagreement, to 
see what Elga’s general view of disagreement recommends. Suppose 
Smith and Jones disagree about whether p on the basis of some 
shared body of evidence. Smith learns this and believes that (prior to 
the disagreement) she’s as reliable as Jones22 on the issue given what 
she’s learned about the circumstances of evaluation. Elga’s view 
would say here that Smith’s probability in p should equal her 
probability in p conditional on these things she’s learned, setting 
aside her and Jones’s reasoning on the issue and the content of their 
assessments themselves.23 Setting these aside, Elga says, Smith 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 In this paper, to avoid a cumbersome sentence structure, I intend the 
admittedly strained reading of “Smith is as reliable as Jones” that entails 
that both Smith and Jones are reliable. I’m not concerned with cases of 
disagreement in which both parties are unreliable, but to the same 
degree. I owe that revelation about myself to Nathan King. 
23 For example, if Smith’s credence in p is 0.8 and Jones’s credence is 0.2, the 
evidence on which Smith conditionalizes should include those facts, but 
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should think it 50% likely that she’s correct (488), i.e., give Jones’s 
assessment the same weight as her own. So, I take it, Elga would 
agree with the following conditional as an instance of his general 
view of disagreement: 
(Equal-Weight View) For any subjects Smith and Jones and for 
any p, if…  
(Smith Judges) Smith’s credence in p on her evidence E 
relevant to p is n1, and 
(Jones Judges) Jones’s credence in p on E is n2, and 
(Disagreement) n1 # n2, and 
(Full Disclosure) Smith learns these three things, and  
(Peerhood) Smith believes that she’s as reliable as Jones 
on this issue in the circumstances of evaluation, excluding 
the assessments themselves and any reasoning by which 
she and Jones arrived at them,24  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
should of course exclude p itself or any instance of the schema P(p) = n.  
24 Objection: If Smith excludes Jones’s reasoning and her own, then if Smith 
learns that her reasoning was fantastic and Jones’s was shabby, the 
View will deliver a counterintuitive conciliatory verdict. Response: 
Before Smith’s evidence is updated, the View gives the intuitive 
conciliatory verdict. After the update, if the other antecedent conditions 
of the View are met, Peerhood plausibly won’t be, since Smith would 
sensibly reason in roughly this way: “Jones knows that her assessment 
(whatever it is) was unreasonable (for whatever reason). Yet 
nevertheless she sticks with it. So, she suffers from cognitive 
malfunction and therefore is not as reliable as I am here in the 
circumstances of evaluation, even setting aside the particular contents of 
our assessments and any reasoning by which we arrived at them.” If 
Smith doesn’t reason this way, then while the antecedent of the View 
may be met, the conciliatory verdict won’t be counterintuitive. 
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…then Smith should give Jones’s assessment of p on this 
evidence the same weight as her own. 
Some philosophers have apparently taken this consequent to entail 
that Smith’s credence in p on this evidence should be (at least 
roughly) the average of n1 and n2.25 For example, Christensen said26 
that in cases of peer disagreement one should “come close to 
‘splitting the difference’” (203) between the initial assessments. And – 
working on an all-or-nothing model of belief and speaking of peers 
who take equally firm but opposing stances on the disputed issue – 
Feldman said that after full disclosure, “suspension of judgment is 
called for.” (235) In this paper, I’ll be concerned with the Equal-
Weight View above, and I won’t take a stand on either Elga’s general 
view of disagreement or a general difference-splitting rule for giving 
equal weight. 
 
Motivating the View 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 And I suspect some have thought that one’s credence in p on one’s 
evidence relevant to p should equal one’s credence in p simpliciter, so 
Smith’s credence in p simpliciter should also be (at least roughly) the 
average of n1 and n2. 
26 The past tense in this paragraph is intentional. In light of things they’ve 
very recently said and written, I suspect (though I’m not certain) that 
Christensen and Feldman would no longer say what they then said on 
this issue. 
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 I take it that many people believe the Equal-Weight View (or 
something like it) because it delivers intuitively correct verdicts in a 
wide variety of cases. For example:  
Feldman’s Quad 
Suppose that you and I are standing by the window looking 
out on the quad. We think we have comparable vision and we 
know each other to be honest. I seem to see what looks to me 
like a person in a blue coat in the middle of the quad. 
(Assume that this is not something odd.) I believe that a 
person with a blue coat is standing on the quad. Meanwhile, 
you seem to see nothing of the kind there. You think that no 
one is standing in the middle of the quad. (223) 
In this case, you and Feldman consider all and only the same 
evidence (namely, the scene before you and any relevant background 
knowledge). Feldman’s visual faculties report to him that there is a 
person in a blue coat in the middle of the quad; his credence in that 
proposition on the available evidence is high. Your faculties report 
otherwise; your credence in that proposition on the evidence is low. 
And you think your faculties are as reliable as Feldman’s. So what 
should you do in such a case, after full disclosure? Clearly you 
should revise your belief to give the report of your faculties and the 
report of his equal weight, just as you would do with disagreeing but 
equally reliable thermometers, clocks, etc. And so the Equal-Weight 
View delivers the right result.  
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 The View also gives the right result in some cases involving a 
priori calculations. For example, Elga (492) and Christensen (193) 
both consider a case in which friends mentally divide a restaurant 
check: 
Restaurant Check  
Suppose that five of us go out to dinner. It’s time to pay the 
check, so the question we’re interested in is how much we 
each owe. We can all see the bill total clearly, we all agree to 
give a 20% tip, and we further agree to split the whole cost 
evenly... I do the math in my head and become highly 
confident that our shares are $43 each. Meanwhile, my friend 
does the math in her head and becomes highly confident that 
our shares are $45 each. (Christensen, 193) 
To differentiate this case from Feldman’s Quad and others crucially 
involving sense perception, let’s stipulate not only that all parties can 
clearly see the check, but that they all know its total. If we stipulate 
also that all parties think the disagreement is between peers, 
Christensen and Elga think that, after full disclosure, each should 
give the other’s assessment the same weight as her own. I agree. 
Here again the View issues the right verdict.  
I take it that concrete case intuitions like these strongly 
motivate the Equal-Weight View. If it weren’t for this intuitive 
support, arguments for the View – such as Elga’s Bootstrapping 




 It’s not all sunshine for the Equal-Weight View, however: in 
some cases it apparently gives the wrong result. Advocates such as 
Christensen and Elga try to explain why these apparent 
counterexamples are merely apparent. I’ll describe some problematic 
cases in this section, and in the next I’ll lay out Christensen’s and 
Elga’s explanations and say why I find them inadequate. Finally, I’ll 
offer my own explanation of these cases, which vindicates the Equal-
Weight View. 
 First, a problematic variation of Restaurant Check: 
Extreme Restaurant Check 
Consider an (admittedly unrealistic) variant on the restaurant 
case, in which my friend becomes confident that our shares of 
the check are $450 – quite a bit over the whole tab. 
(Christensen, 199) 
Intuitively, one shouldn’t significantly alter her initial assessment of 
the shares in this case. Christensen and Elga agree. Christensen says, 
“Here, I think that I need not significantly reduce my confidence in 
my $43 answer, or raise my very low confidence in the $450 answer.” 
(199) Elga says, “It certainly seems as though you should be more 
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confident that you are right than that your friend is.” (490-1) But, 
they admit, the Equal-Weight View seems to recommend otherwise. 
 Consider a new case: Dual Introspection. Suppose there’s a 
region of the brain responsible for bodily sensations. And suppose 
you justifiably believe Alex Byrne when he says “I must have some 
sort of mechanism… for detecting my own mental states….” 
(forthcoming) Suppose a trustworthy neuroscientist persuades you 
that she has hooked up your brain and introspective mechanism with 
Jones’s so that you and Jones now regularly have (at least type-) 
identical bodily sensations and equal introspective abilities with 
respect to these experiences. 
This neuroscientist causes you (and thereby Jones) to have 
complicated bodily sensations as of fleeting pains, itches, and tickles, 
and asks you both to report on the phenomenal character of your 
experiences. Given your beliefs about the setup and your long track 
record, you’re both comfortable issuing reports of the forms “We are 
experiencing  ____,” and “S/he is experiencing ____,” based on 
introspection. Usually, these reports are true. But due to the 
kaleidoscopic phenomenology of some of these experiences, 
occasionally you’re mistaken. You learn this. Jones proves to be as 
reliable as you in her introspective abilities, so you count her as a 
peer here. You also believe that she’s completely honest.  
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The two of you are asked to introspect a complicated bodily 
sensation and assess the claim that you (the reader) are experiencing 
pain. You introspect and find a fleeting sensation that may have been 
a pain, but then again, perhaps it was just an oppressive itch. Finally, 
suppose you and Jones disagree about whether you’re in pain after 
full disclosure. It seems that in this case you should give her 
assessment equal weight. Perhaps she introspectively got a better 
look at that elusive sensation than you did after all. 
 However, consider a variant case: Extreme Dual Introspection. 
The setup is the same, except this time you introspect and (seem to) 
find fierce pain. Your credence in the claim that you (the reader) are 
experiencing pain is therefore very high. Jones introspects and 
reports that her credence in this proposition is low. What should you 
do? Obviously, you shouldn’t significantly alter your initial 
assessment. But the Equal-Weight View seems to recommend 
otherwise. 
 An explanation of how its antecedent may not be met in these 
cases would snatch the Equal-Weight View from the jaws of the 
apparent counterexamples. Ideally, this explanation would be 
general enough not to founder on variations of the problematic cases. 
Christensen and Elga offer such explanations. I’ll now describe these 




 Christensen considers Extreme Restaurant Check and offers 
this explanation: 
It is much more likely that she calculated and has not brought 
common-sense checking to bear. Now I take it that this sort of 
common-sense checking is much less liable to error than mental 
arithmetic. (201) 
Later, Christensen adds: 
The real ground for thinking that my friend made the error in 
the Extreme Restaurant Case derives from the fact I have 
evidence that my assessment of the disputed proposition is 
supported by an extremely reliable kind of reasoning, but I 
have no basis for supposing the same about my friend’s 
contrary assessment. (201) 
The idea seems to be that in this case you come to learn something 
relevant about the reasoning you and your friend used to answer the 
question. You learn that she probably didn’t use a highly reliable 
procedure – namely commonsense checking – which you have 
reason to believe you did use. Conditional on your using 
commonsense checking and your friend’s failing to use it, you 
shouldn’t think that she’s as reliable as you on this issue, in which 
case (Christensen apparently thinks) the Peerhood condition in the 
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antecedent of the Equal-Weight View is not satisfied. If so, the View 
doesn’t issue the counterintuitive conciliatory verdict.  
 This explanation is unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, a 
motivating insight behind the Equal-Weight View is that – to avoid 
being unacceptably arbitrary or question-begging – each party’s 
evaluation of the other as peer or non-peer should be independent of 
(or “prior to,” as Elga says) the content of the disagreeing 
assessments and any reasoning that led to these assessments. As 
Christensen says, “I should assess explanations for the disagreement 
in a way that’s independent of my reasoning on the matter under 
dispute.” (199) I find it hard to see how in Extreme Restaurant Check 
Christensen’s evidence that his “assessment of the disputed 
proposition is supported by an extremely reliable kind of reasoning” 
is independent of that reasoning.  
By way of explanation, Christensen says, “My grounds for 
discounting my friend’s belief are based on considerations about my 
reasoning, but not on that reasoning itself.” (201) But it isn’t clear to 
me that this is so if Christensen’s ground for discounting his friend’s 
belief is his evidence that he used commonsense checking. 
Presumably, Christensen’s evidence that he used commonsense 
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checking is first-personal – based on introspection or memory.27 It’s 
hard to see what Christensen would be introspecting or 
remembering, other than his reasoning process itself, in which case 
his evidence that he used commonsense checking wouldn’t be 
independent of that reasoning. The reasoning hasn’t been set aside or 
bracketed off, it’s been remembered or introspected.28 But if that 
evidence isn’t independent of his reasoning, then according to 
Christensen’s own test, it fails to support an explanation in terms of 
his friend’s failure. So by Christensen’s own standard, this cannot be 
the explanation of why the Equal-Weight View fails to apply in this 
case.  
The second reason Christensen’s explanation is unsatisfactory is 
that it doesn’t cover variant cases. Suppose you come to know that in 
fact your friend did use the same highly reliable procedures you 
used. In this case, we cannot appeal to any difference in reasoning 
procedures to justify the claim that Peerhood (or any other 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27!If that evidence is not first-personal, but based instead on Christensen's 
track record, dispositions, epistemic virtues, etc., then it's not clear that 
there is no parallel evidence in favor of thinking that his friend also 
used commonsense checking. (Or at least there's a problematic case in 
which there is such evidence.) But in that case we can't accept 
Christensen's explanation of why Peerhood isn't met.!
28 Clearly, Christensen’s evidence could be independent of the result of his 
reasoning: his introspective/memorial evidence need not presuppose 
that his reasoning was accurate in the end. I worry that such a narrow 
principle of independence will license steadfastness when one should be 
conciliatory, though I can’t develop that worry here. Peerhood should 
require setting aside both one’s answer and any reasoning that delivered 
it. 
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condition) is not met. And yet even in this variant case, the intuition 
persists that we should not accord her (obviously false) assessment 
equal weight. Christensen’s explanation does not tell us why this is 
so. 
 For instance, stipulate in Extreme Dual Introspection that Jones 
uses only the same procedure (namely introspection) as you used to 
arrive at her judgment, so you cannot demote her from peerhood for 
the reason Christensen suggests in Extreme Restaurant Check. Still, 
intuitively you shouldn’t accord her assessment that you are not in 
pain the same weight as your own assessment that you are in pain. 
And so it still seems that the Equal-Weight View delivers 
counterintuitive verdicts. If the antecedent of the View actually fails 
to be met in these cases, we don’t yet know why. 
 
Elga’s Explanation 
 Elga takes care to point out that Peerhood requires 
conditionalization on the circumstances of disagreement. Elga then 
says this: “…the circumstances of disagreement might include such 
factors as: …how absurd each of you finds the other’s answer.” (490) 
Later, he adds: 
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And one circumstance of the split-the-check disagreement is 
that you are extremely confident that your advisor’s answer is 
wrong – much more confident than you are that your answer is 
right. Indeed, her answer strikes you as obviously insane. So in 
order to apply the equal weight view, we must determine your 
prior probability that you would be right, conditional on these 
circumstances arising. (491) 
Elga’s explanation seems to be this: it’s natural to assume that there’s 
something about the circumstance of disagreement that should 
demote your friend from peerhood, namely the fact that you find her 
answer insane. Assuming that you take the prior probability that you 
would be right conditional on this asymmetry to be greater than 0.5, 
Peerhood is not met. 
 However, variant cases are problematic for Elga’s explanation. 
If symmetry is restored – if we stipulate, that is, that your friend also 
finds your answer insane – then, according to Elga, the description of 
the case doesn’t settle whether Peerhood is satisfied. Elga considers 
such a symmetrical case and says that the Equal-Weight View’s 
verdict depends on the answer to the question “Conditional on the 
two of us disagreeing, and each of us finding the other’s answer to be 
insane, do I think that the two of us are equally likely to be right?” If 
the answer is “yes,” Elga says, then the View rules that you should 
be conciliatory. Elga says that he finds that plausible. 
 73!
 I, however, find that deeply implausible. And so I don’t find 
Elga’s explanation satisfactory. I think that in this symmetrical 
variant of Extreme Restaurant Check, you should not give your 
friend’s assessment equal weight even if the answer to that last 
question is “yes,” since your friend’s answer is obviously false. Given 
that, you shouldn’t significantly alter your assessment, regardless of 
how she feels about your answer, and regardless of your track record 
of disagreement with her. You are entitled to believe that your 
friend’s answer is wrong – and therefore not be conciliatory – come 
what may. But Elga disagrees. 
 For similar reasons, Elga’s explanation fares poorly when 
applied to a variant of the Extreme Dual Introspection case. Recall 
that Jones introspects and reports that she fails to find any pain. You, 
however, introspect and (seem to) find fierce, excruciating pain, as 
though you’ve stepped in an angry bear trap. Suppose you are both 
highly confident that the other is wrong, and suppose you have a 
track record such that you answer “yes” to the question “Conditional 
on the two of us disagreeing and each of us finding the other’s 
answer insane, do I think that we’re equally likely to be right?” 
According to Elga, you should now significantly weaken – and 
perhaps even abandon – your belief that you’re in pain.  
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But isn’t it obvious that you should not significantly weaken 
that belief? You are directly acquainted with fierce, excruciating pain; 
the pain is staring (slapping?) you in the face, so to speak. The belief 
that you’re in pain is certain for you, and should not be abandoned 
no matter what you come to think about Jones’s opinions of your 
belief, your track record, etc. But then Elga’s explanation stumbles 
here. If the Equal-Weight View fails to apply to these cases, we don’t 
yet know why. 
 
My Explanation 
 I’ll now explain why the Equal-Weight View doesn’t issue 
counterintuitive verdicts in the extreme cases described above. If my 
explanation succeeds in those cases on which Elga’s and 
Christensen’s explanations founder, then my explanation should be 
preferred.   
 Sometimes we see that p is true by seeing that some other 
proposition q is true.29 In those cases, we might say our knowledge 
that p comes by way of a report, indication, or representation. Other 
times, we just see that p is true, directly. Occasionally – it’s said – we 
just see that p, with our eyes. Here “just see” is used in a literal sense. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 For example, the forest ranger sees that the forest floor is on fire by seeing 
that smoke rises from the treetops. 
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Looking down, one might say, “I just see that I have hands – there 
they are, directly in front of me.” On other occasions we 
metaphorically just see that p, without the aid of our eyes. For 
example, we just see that no prime minister is a prime number and 
that 2 + 2 = 4. It is this metaphorical sense of the ordinary English 
expression “just see” that interests me for the rest of this paper.  
 In Extreme Restaurant Check, Smith just sees – in the 
metaphorical sense – that her friend’s answer is wrong. And in the 
Extreme Dual Introspection case, Smith just sees – in that same sense 
– that she’s in pain. In philosophy-speak, we might say Smith comes 
to have knowledge from direct acquaintance in the problematic cases 
described above. A relevant piece of evidence is intellectually 
obvious to Smith; she has unmediated cognitive access to the truth of 
a pertinent proposition. Her knowledge does not rely on any report, 
indication, or representation. 
 And that’s why Smith shouldn’t be conciliatory about the 
proposition in question on her evidence: her evidence she can just see 
– call it “immediately accessible evidence” – includes either her 
answer or the negation of her friend’s answer. Via rational intuition, 
the proposition that it’s not the case that each share of this check is $450 is 
part of Smith’s immediately accessible evidence in Extreme 
Restaurant Check. Via introspection, the proposition that I am in pain 
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is part of Smith’s immediately accessible evidence in Extreme Dual 
Introspection.30 These are pertinent facts about the situations that 
Smith appreciates; they have thereby entered Smith’s cognitive 
economy. 
 Given that, in the problematic cases, Smith – sensible person 
that she is – may reflect on the state of Jones’s cognitive economy in 
roughly the following way: “I just see the truth of a relevant piece of 
evidence. Jones does as well, or she doesn’t. If she doesn’t, then I 
have evidence she lacks, and so Jones Judges isn’t met. If she does, 
then either there’s merely apparent disagreement,31 or Jones just sees 
the truth of some proposition and yet believes it’s false. If the former, 
then Disagreement isn’t met. If the latter, then here in the 
circumstances of evaluation, Jones suffers from cognitive 
malfunction and so is not as reliable as I am on this issue, even 
setting aside the particular contents of our answers and any 
reasoning that led us to them.”  
 Full Disclosure and Peerhood require that Smith believe 
certain things. If Smith reasons in this sensible and straightforward 
way, she’ll reject some belief such that at least one of those conditions 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 N.b., I’m not claiming that a proposition of the form it seems to me that p or 
I have the intuition that p gets into one’s immediately accessible evidence 
here. Rather, p itself (one’s answer or the negation of one’s friend’s 
answer) enters one’s immediately accessible evidence in these cases.  
31 E.g., Jones is honestly misreporting or dishonestly reporting, or Smith has 
misunderstood Jones’s report. 
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isn’t met. If so, the View’s antecedent won’t be satisfied in the 
problematic cases above, and so the View won’t issue 
counterintuitive conciliatory verdicts. (If Smith doesn’t reason this 
sensible and straightforward way, then while the antecedent of the 
View may be met, the conciliatory recommendation won’t be 
counterintuitive.) 
 Why does the Equal-Weight View give the intuitive verdict in 
the non-extreme cases? There, the relevant knowledge Smith gains is 
knowledge from reports: Smith doesn’t just see that p but rather receives 
a report that p from her faculties. Smith then learns of the disagreeing 
report of Jones’s faculties. And if someone has disagreeing reports 
from two sources she takes to be equally reliable, then ceteris paribus 
she should give them equal weight. This goes for thermometers, 
clocks, and – in the case of Feldman’s Quad – visual faculties. 
 We non-savants enlist a cadre of cognitive faculties for complex 
calculations, and we lean heavily on memory. In Restaurant Check, 
we don’t just see that each share of the check is $43 (though we do 
just see that each share of the check isn’t $450). Rather, our faculties 
report the answer, after some complicated calculations. And if I take 
my faculties to be as reliable as yours, then I should be conciliatory 
when I learn of the disagreeing report from your faculties.  
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 In the non-extreme Dual Introspection case, though I am 
directly acquainted with pain (if it’s there), its elusiveness prevents a 
level of attention sufficient to come to know from this acquaintance 
that I am in pain. While I just see the pain (if it’s there), I don’t just see 
that I am in pain. I judge that I am in pain, but here my judgment 
crucially relies on the reports of memory. When I receive the report 
of your faculties in the case as described, I should be conciliatory. 
 Rational intuition and introspection do not merely give us 
knowledge from reports. With at least some cases of introspection 
and rational intuition, there is no appearance/reality distinction, and 
so no appearance that reports or represents reality. Introspection 
does not merely represent that there is pain, as my visual experience 
represents that there is a computer before me. No, by introspecting I 
can become directly aware of pain itself, and with sufficient attention 
I can thereby just see that I am in pain. Rational intuition does not 
merely testify that 2 + 2 = 4 as my kindergarten teacher did. No, via 
rational intuition I can just see that 2 + 2 = 4. And while it would be 
unacceptably arbitrary to dismiss the report that p from your friend’s 
faculties on the basis of the report that not-p from your own faculties 
(when you take your faculties to be equally reliable), it is not 
unacceptably arbitrary to do so on the basis of not-p when you just 
see that not-p. In fact, such steadfastness is called for.  
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 Our ability to just see the truth of propositions distinguishes us 
from thermometers, clocks, etc., which merely report, and explains 
why the Equal-Weight View does not issue counterintuitive 
recommendations. By giving such an explanation, I have vindicated 
the View from those apparent counterexamples. And my explanation 
covers variations of these cases on which Christensen’s and Elga’s 
explanations founder. Therefore, my explanation should be 
preferred. Let me now vindicate the View from one more objection. 
 
Self-Defeat? 
Critics have charged that if an adherent of the Equal-Weight 
View knows of even one equally informed peer who disbelieves it 
strongly enough, then giving the peer’s assessment equal weight will 
require giving up the View itself. The critics often graciously 
volunteer to play the role of the disagreeing peer. So – they conclude 
– if the View is true, we shouldn’t believe it. And of course if it’s false 
we shouldn’t believe it either.32 
But this objection should not trouble the adherent of the Equal-
Weight View, since the explanation I gave above provides a handy 
and satisfying response. There we learned how the antecedent of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 Plantinga (2000) offers this type of objection.!
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Equal-Weight View might not be satisfied in cases involving 
knowledge from that unmediated access to the truth of propositions 
sometimes afforded by rational intuition. And it’s plausible that the 
Equal-Weight View is itself a deliverance of rational intuition. Even 
Thomas Kelly, a prominent opponent of the View, admits that 
“reflection on certain kinds of cases can make it seem almost trivial 
or obviously true.” (forthcoming) 
With further reflection, I think, one can come to just see the 
truth of the View – not only does it seem obvious, but upon further 
reflection it just is obvious.33, 34 Its non-adherents have, for all their 
virtues, failed to fully appreciate this. And if an adherent of the View 
does just see its truth, its antecedent will not be satisfied when she 
reflects on the skeptic’s cognitive economy in the way described 
above. If so, the View won’t recommend giving itself up merely 
because there are intelligent, informed, and firm disbelievers of the 
View, and so the View won’t be self-defeating. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33 Though not, of course, as obvious as, e.g., that each share of this check isn’t 
$450 in Extreme Restaurant Check. Obviousness comes in degrees. 
34 Objection: The Equal-Weight View is complicated and obscure, and so 
not plausibly a proposition one can just see the truth of. Response: 
Don’t sell yourself short. Also, it often happens that a complicated and 
obscure sentence expresses an obviously true proposition. For many of us, 
this is the case with “Kein Premierminister ist eine Primzahl.” Likewise 
with some statements of the Equal-Weight View, I believe.!
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Dualist Intuitions 
 Suppose the Equal-Weight View is true. Now consider a subject 
who believes dualism on the basis of an intellectual seeming. In the 
standard thought experiments, she claims to just see that dualism is 
true. One might suspect that, if this subject knows of an equally 
informed peer who disbelieves dualism strongly enough, then giving 
the peer’s assessment equal weight will require giving up the View 
itself. And so, one might suspect that we have here a defeater for our 
dualist intuitions. 
 But these considerations do not furnish us with a defeater for 
our dualist intuitions, even if we adhere to the Equal-Weight View.  
Above, we learned how the antecedent of the Equal-Weight View 
might not be satisfied in cases involving knowledge from that 
unmediated access to the truth of propositions sometimes afforded 
by introspection and rational intuition. And it may well be that, in 
the standard thought experiments, one comes to have knowledge of 
the truth of dualism via exactly this sort of direct acquaintance. As 
we noted in the first chapter, even committed non-dualists report the 
intuitive appeal of dualism. 
Therefore, if an adherent of dualism does just see its truth, the 
antecedent of the Equal-Weight View will not be satisfied when she 
reflects on the non-dualist’s cognitive economy in the way described 
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above. If so, the View won’t recommend giving up dualism merely 
because there are intelligent, informed, and firm disbelievers of 
dualism, and so the Equal-Weight View does not provide a defeater 
for dualism held on the basis of intuition. 
 
Objection 
One might object this way: “Intellectual seemings are defeasible. Or 
at the very least it is illicit to assume that they are indefeasible for the 
purposes of the Methdological Argument of this dissertation. We 
have been looking for undercutting defeaters of our dualist 
intuitions, after all. And so the only evidence that we have a right to 
assert is that Possibility and Non-Identity seem true. It’s illegitimate 
to assert that they just are true, i.e. that those propositions are part of 
our immediately accessible evidence, suitable for playing the role I 
put them to in the face of apparent peer disagreement.  
But then consider a genuine case of disagreement between the 
dualist and the non-dualist, both of whom share these intellectual 
seemings. Surely such disagreements actually happen. (Though 
Possibility and Non-Identity seem true to the non-dualist, she 
ultimately rejects these seemings as misleading in light of her total 
evidence.) In such a case there is no asymmetry that the dualist can 
point to in order to evade the antecedent of the Equal-Weight View. 
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And it’s implausible that the non-dualist is suffering from cognitive 
dysfunction merely for rejecting an intellectual seeming. But then, 
supposing that the Peerhood condition could be met (and it no doubt 
could), the antecedent Equal-Weight View will be satisfied, and it 
will recommend that the dualist give up her belief. And thus we have 
an undercutting defeater for dualism.”35 
 
Response 
What Extreme Restaurant Check and Extreme Dual Introspection 
show, I believe, is that it is sometimes perfectly legitimate for a party 
to a disagreement to recognize that the content of her belief occupies 
a special place in her evidence base. Though it would be illegitimate 
to reason from the content of the disputed claim to the conclusion 
that the other party to the debate is in error, these cases seem to show 
that it is acceptable for the subject to admit that the contested claim 
(or one that straightforwardly entails that her friend is wrong) is part 
of her immediately accessible evidence. This, I think, explains why 
we need not be conciliatory in cases of extreme disagreement. 
 If the objector is right, it’s hard to see why we shouldn’t be 
conciliatory even in cases of extreme disagreement. But that’s quite 
counterintuitive. For suppose that the objector is right and all that a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 I owe this suggestion to Adam Pautz, though I may not be doing it justice. 
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subject to an extreme disagreement can legitimately recognize as part 
of her evidence is that it seems to her that p. And suppose the objector 
is right that it’s possible for p to seem true to a subject, and yet 
nevertheless the subject fails to believe p in full epistemic propriety. 
And suppose there are extreme disagreements in which the contested 
proposition intellectually seems true to both parties. We can stipulate 
that this occurs in Extreme Restaurant Check, for example.  
 If the objector is right, and if the Equal-Weight View is true, 
then it’s difficult to see why the Peerhood condition would fail to be 
met. But then we ought to be conciliatory in this version of Extreme 
Restaurant Check. For what it’s worth, I think that is a disastrous 
result. Your friend tells you each share of this check is $450. This 
strikes you as obviously false. In fact, it intellectually seems false to 
your friend as well, but only in a sense of “intellectually seems that 
p” that is consistent with rejecting p while not suffering from 
cognitive dysfunction. Must you really reduce your confidence that 
each share of this check is not $450? I think not. And so I conclude 
that either the objector is wrong or the Equal-Weight View is false. 
That is, either it is perfectly legitimate for a subject to a disagreement 
to recognize that the propositions delivered to her by intuition are 
part of her evidence and so reason in the way described above in My 
Explanation, or the Equal-Weight View is false. Either way, the dualist 
will be off the hook when it comes to disagreement with well-
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informed non-dualists, even those who share her dualist intuitions. 
Either the objector is wrong and so the story I told above is true: the 
Equal-Weight View is silent in such a case. Or, the Equal-Weight 






So far, we have learned that there are no successful undercutting 
defeaters for our dualist intuitions. We have also learned that 
conciliatory views of peer disagreement would not provide a 
defeater for dualist intuitions. In this chapter, we will investigate the 
prospects for a rebutting defeater for our dualist intuitions. 
 
Definitions 
Let’s begin with a few definitions. For any proposition p, a defeater of 
a subject Smith’s belief that p is some evidence E for another 
proposition p* such that, if Smith believes that p and then gains 
access to E and takes it as evidence in favor of p*, then Smith must 
believe that p less strongly.36 Something counts as a rebutting defeater 
for Smith’s belief that p iff it is a defeater, and the defeating evidence 
involved is evidence for the proposition that not-p.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 Here, I do not mean a merely psychological notion, i.e. that as a matter of 
nomic necessity (given one's physical and psychological make-up), one 
cannot persist in believing that p as strongly as before. Rather, I mean 
that, given certain epistemic norms, one shouldn't persist in believing 
that p as strongly as before. One cannot so persist in full epistemic 
propriety. 
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Let's say a rebutting defeater for Smith’s belief that p is merely 
diminishing iff when Smith comes to accept the defeating evidence as 
evidence for not-p, she can reasonably persist in believing that p, 
though not as strongly as before. Let's say a rebutting defeater for 
Smith’s belief that p is neutralizing iff when Smith comes to accept the 
defeating evidence as evidence for not-p, she can't reasonably persist 
in believing that p, but also can't reasonably believe that not-p; Smith 
must be agnostic about the issue. Finally let's say a rebutting defeater 
for Smith’s belief that p is overriding iff when Smith comes to accept 
the defeating evidence as evidence for not-p, she can't reasonably 
persist in believing that p and must now believe that not-p.   
 
Standards for Success  
Not just any evidence is sufficient for an overriding rebutting 
defeater. The strength of a rebutting defeater is a function of the type 
of defeating evidence. Say I believe that p on some evidence E: what 
it is reasonable or sensible to do in light of new evidence E* for not-p 
will depend on which evidence – E or E* – is “better” or “more 
credible” in some intuitive sense.  
For example, say that I take Alan to be a generally reliable 
source of information. Alan testifies that he saw Bob buy a Frisbee at 
noon, I come to believe on this basis that Bob bought a Frisbee at 
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noon (call this proposition p). But suppose that later, I receive 
testimony from Bob – whom I take to be as generally reliable as 
Alan—that he was sick in bed all day, and has never bought any 
Frisbees at all. In this case, my evidence in the form of Bob's 
testimony overrides my evidence for p, and I should come to believe 
that not-p. Since I take it that Bob was in a better position to know 
whether p, and since he testifies that not-p, Bob’s report supplies me 
with an overriding rebutting defeater for my belief that p. The better 
and more credible evidence from Bob trumped the evidence from 
Alan.  
 Now suppose that Alan and Bob were in an equal position to 
know the truth of some proposition, say the content of the mayor's 
speech last week. I take them to be equally honest, to have equal 
auditory, vocal, and memory capacities, and to have both been in an 
equally suitable position to hear the mayor's speech. And suppose 
these beliefs of mine are all true. Alan testifies on the basis of 
memory that the mayor admitted to corruption (call this proposition 
q). Having no reason to think otherwise, naturally I come to believe q 
on the basis of this testimony. But just then Bob testifies on the basis 
of memory that it's not the case that the mayor admitted to 
corruption (not-q).  
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In this case, the testimony from Alan that q and testimony 
from Bob that not-q cancel out, so I withhold belief in q and I 
withhold belief in not-q. In the absence of any other evidence, I 
should be agnostic on the question of whether the mayor admitted to 
corruption. Here, Bob’s report has supplied me with a neutralizing 
rebutting defeater. There are better and worse sources of evidence, 
and when I have conflicting evidence, I favor what I take to be the 
better source. Only when I take the sources to be on a par should I 
suspend judgment – only then should I be agnostic on the issue.   
 Finally, suppose that Alan, a brilliant mathematician, testifies 
to me that 7+5=75. On the basis of intuition, I believe that 7+5=12. Is 
the evidence of Alan’s testimony so credible as to furnish me with an 
overriding or neutralizing rebutting defeater? I believe it is not. At 
most, this evidence is a diminishing defeater. The intuitive basis of 
my belief that 7+5=12 is better than the evidence I have in favor of 
the proposition that 7+5=75.  
 So it goes with expert testimony versus intuition, but what do 
we say about the case of powerful but abstruse philosophical 
arguments? What sort of rebutting defeaters can they offer to strong 
intuitions? For example, consider this argument for the conclusion 
that 2=1: First, let a=b, where a and b are non-zero quantities. Then, 
multiply both sides by a, to get a2=ab. Now subtract both sides by b2, 
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to get a2-b2=ab-b2. Next, factor both sides to get (a-b)(a+b)=b(a-b). Then, 
divide both sides by (a-b) to get (a+b)=b. Since we were given that 
a=b, we can infer that b+b=b. By combining like terms on the left, we 
get that 2b=b. Finally, if we divide both sides by the non-zero b, we 
get the conclusion that 2=1, Q.E.D.  
 Does this argument furnish us with an overriding or 
neutralizing rebutting defeater for our intuitive belief that 2!1? 
Clearly not. In general, deductive arguments are merely invitations 
to compare subjective probabilities. On the one hand, we consider 
the probability of the conjunction of the argument’s premises 
together with each of the argument’s inferences in the form of 
conditionals. On the other hand, we consider the negation of the 
conclusion. Together, this conjunction and the negation of the 
conclusion form an inconsistent set. So, one cannot rationally believe 
both members of the set: at least one must go.  
And so, if the negation of the conclusion of this argument 
deserves sufficiently higher credence than the conjunction of the 
premises or inferences, then the right thing to do is to reject the 
conjunction. In the argument of the previous paragraph, the 
conjunction of all the steps is far more dubious than the proposition 
that 2!1. Therefore, the appropriate thing to do here is to persist in 
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the belief that 2!1 and to suspect some catch in the argument, even if 
one cannot identify the catch.  
 
Rebutting Defeaters for Dualism 
A rebutting defeater for dualism would consist of an argument for 
non-dualism or an objection to dualism. In this section, I will lay out 
the most common examples of each type of rebutting defeater. I will 
refrain from responding specifically to these arguments. Instead, I 
will describe in the next section a general strategy for responding to 
these defeaters, using David Papineau’s Causal Argument as a 
paradigm example.  
 First, arguments for non-dualism (cf. Stoljar 2009). Many 
arguments for non-dualism rely on some sort of causal exclusion 
principle. These arguments typically proceed by first assuming that 
every event that has a cause has a physical cause. The second 
premise is that mental events have physical effects. These arguments 
then assert some variation of a causal exclusion principle (see for 
example Kim 1993, Melnyk 1994, Peacocke 1979, and Yablo 1992).  
While the details vary, the principle asserts roughly that for any 
cause C with effect E, there is no cause C* of E which is not 
supervenient on C. Conclusion: mental events are supervenient on 
physical events. While such a supervenience claim is not strictly 
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incompatible with dualism as I have defined it—since at least one 
mental type may not be identical with any naturalistically-acceptable 
type even while the mental supervenes on the physical—it is 
inconsistent with our dualist intuition of Possibility.  
 A second line of argument in favor of non-dualism is 
inductive. For example, J.J.C. Smart (1959, 142) reasons as follows:  
[S]cience is increasingly giving us a viewpoint whereby 
organisms are able to be seen as physico-chemical 
mechanisms. . . . There does seem to be, so far as science is 
concerned, nothing in the world but increasingly complex 
arrangements of physical constituents. All except for one 
place: in consciousness. . . . That everything should be 
explicable in terms of physics . . . except the occurrence of 
sensations seems to me to be frankly unbelievable.  
The argument, I take it, proceeds by enumerative induction. Smart 
begins by claiming that a wide variety of phenomena lend 
themselves to wholly physical explanation. The conclusion 
generalizes to all varieties of phenomena, claiming that everything—
including the mental—should be explicable in terms of physics. 
Again, while this conclusion is not by itself inconsistent with dualism 
as I have defined it, it is plausible that it is inconsistent with our 
dualist intuition of Possibility. If Possibility were true—if mental 
types could be instantiated without any candidate naturalistically-
acceptable type or vice versa—it’s hard to see how the mental could 
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be wholly explicable in naturalistic terms. (See also Melnyk 2003 for a 
sustained defense of this type of inductive argument.)  
 Smart also offers a related argument, which appeals to an 
alleged theoretical simplicity of non-dualism vis-à-vis dualism. He 
says (ibid., 142-3) that if dualism were true sensations would have to 
be “nomological danglers,” and that “it is not often realized how odd 
would be the laws whereby these nomological danglers would 
dangle… I cannot believe that ultimate laws of nature could relate 
simple constituents to configurations consisting of perhaps billions of 
neurons… Such ultimate laws would be like nothing so far known in 
science.” The idea, I take it, is that dualism posits an unnecessary 
number of fundamental types and laws, and that the laws connecting 
these types to the constituents of brains would be enormously 
complex. For these two reasons, then, simplicity favors non-dualism.   
 A fourth and final type of argument for non-dualism appeals 
to methodological naturalism. Here’s how Stoljar (2009, §16) puts it: 
The first premise of this argument is that it is rational to be 
guided in one's metaphysical commitments by the methods of 
natural science. Lying behind this premise are the arguments 
of Quine and others that metaphysics should not be 
approached in a way that is distinct from the sciences but 
should rather be thought of as continuous with it. The second 
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premise of the argument is that, as a matter of fact, the 
metaphysical picture of the world that one is led to by the 
methods of natural science is physicalism. The conclusion is 
that it is rational to believe physicalism, or, more briefly that 
physicalism is true.  
For this argument to cut against dualism as I have defined it, one 
must take the second premise to assert that the metaphysical picture 
of the world best supported by the natural sciences is one in which 
each mental property type is identical with some naturalistically-
acceptable property type. 
 This concludes, I believe, a survey of the most influential and 
plausible arguments for non-dualism. Before turning to a general 
response to these arguments, I will first describe another type of 
rebutting defeater for dualism: objections to dualism.  
 One popular type of objection to dualism is Kim’s Pairing 
Problem (see Kim 2005, 70–92).  The objection goes like this. First, 
Kim argues that causal interaction between objects requires that 
those objects be spatially situated. Next, Kim points out that, on 
standard forms of Cartesian dualism, souls are not spatially located. 
Conclusion: souls don’t cause anything to happen. Many would 
consider this a cost of dualism, if the argument is sound.  
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 Dean Zimmerman (2010) argues that a mere dualism of 
property types (what I’ve been calling “dualism”) without a 
corresponding dualism of the substances that bear those properties 
(what is commonly called “substance dualism”) is problematic. First, 
Zimmerman argues against “act-object” theories of perception, on 
which phenomenal properties like red are properties of objects. On 
these theories, phenomenal redness would be a property of sense 
data, brains themselves, or external objects. The first two are 
implausible, according to Zimmerman, and the third option is 
contrary to the spirit of property dualism. So, Zimmerman 
concludes, the property dualist ought to accept an adverbial or 
intentionalist account of phenomenal properties.  
The problem for the property dualist arises, according to 
Zimmerman, if she identifies the subject of experience with a 
“garden-variety” physical object, such as a brain or body. For these 
objects are vague in their spatial and temporal boundaries. And 
“[g]iven what we know about the close connections between brain 
activity and phenomenal experience in our own case, laws of qualia 
generation have, very roughly, the form: whenever some neurons are 
organized and behaving like so — e.g., like the ones in my brain right 
now — something-or-other will be caused to have such-and-such 
fundamental phenomenal property.” But what is this “something-or-
other”? Brains and bodies have vague boundaries—there are many 
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eligible candidates for being my brain or my body. So the property 
dualist who identifies the subjects of conscious experience with 
garden-variety material objects has a trilemma: either the laws of 
nature governing qualia generation are prodigal, exact, or under-
generative.  
 Prodigality: perhaps the laws of qualia generation target all 
the precise candidates for what we mean by “brain” or “body” and 
more. If I am the subject of experience, then, “I” will not pick out a 
garden-variety material object. Exactness: perhaps the laws of qualia 
generation target all and only the precise candidates for what we 
mean by “brain” or “body.” But this would implausibly “attribute to 
nature itself a touching deference to our linguistic practices and to 
our rough-and-ready concepts.” Under-generation: perhaps the laws 
of qualia generation target some proper subset of the precise 
candidates for what we mean by “brain” or “body.” Then again I 
would fail to be a garden-variety material object, and the brain or 
body “will be at best sort of conscious. Whatever else I know about 
myself right now, I know that I am definitely conscious; so if a smaller 
thing or things definitely have the adverbial qualia, I am not the thing 
that is only indefinitely conscious; I am that smaller thing…”  
 Thus, Zimmerman concludes, the mere property dualist is 
pushed into a sort of “speculative materialism,” on which subjects of 
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conscious experience are not garden-variety material objects but 
rather bizarre metaphysical entities. This, Zimmerman concludes, 
warrants the conclusion that substance dualism is a live option and 
in many ways preferable to mere property dualism. Insofar as he is 
correct, this is an objection to mere property dualism.  
 Robert Adams (1987, 243-62) argues that mere dualism 
unconjoined with theism is untenable. The argument goes as follows: 
A scientific explanation of a correlation is adequate only if (i) the law 
in terms of which it is explained must be more general than the 
correlation, i.e. the law correlates things that do or could occur more 
widely than the terms of the correlation to be explained, and (ii) the 
explanation does not presuppose any of the facts to be explained. 
Adams then argues that, absent a theistic explanation, the requisite 
generality is impossible in the case of mind-body correlations. The 
reason is that in order to explain the correlation between a brain state 
B and sensation S, one would have to find a physical state the 
description of which (in more general terms) B uniquely satisfies and 
is correlated with a conscious state the description of which (in more 
general terms) is uniquely satisfied by S. There are no such general 
descriptions, Adams argues, because such general descriptions 
would require analyzing sensations as structured complexes (but 
some are simple not all are amenable to such analysis), or arranging 
sensations on a scale, assigning numerical values to them, and 
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discovering an algorithm for finding the numerical value of the 
corresponding sensation given a numerical value determined by 
certain quantities in a physical state. But this too is impossible, since 
sensations do not admit of such an arrangement over a range of 
mathematical values (in any non-ad hoc or non-question-begging 
way). Even if we could arrange the sounds in a sound space ordered 
on pitch, loundness, etc. and even if we could arrange the colors in a 
three dimensional color space (hue, brightness, and saturation), 
“[t]he chief difficulty with this strategy is that these orderings cannot 
be extended to the other sensory modalities, and are not naturally 
integrated with each other” (1987, 257). Thus, Adams concludes, 
dualism without theism leaves mind-body correlations unexplained. 
And that, no doubt, is a cost for any view of the mind.  
 This completes a brief survey of some of the most prominent 
rebutting defeaters for dualism that have been proposed. It would no 
doubt require much space to respond to each in detail. Instead, I will 
provide a general strategy for responding to such rebutting defeaters, 
using one paradigmatic example. What I say about the paradigmatic 
example will apply to any proposed rebutting defeater for dualism.  
 
A General Response to Rebutting Defeaters 
 99!
I will now lay out a general response to rebutting defeaters for 
dualism, using Papineau's (2002, 17-18) Causal Argument as a 
paradigm example:  
(1) Conscious mental occurrences have physical effects. 
(2) All physical effects are fully caused by purely physical 
histories. 
(3) The physical effects of conscious causes aren’t always 
overdetermined by distinct causes. 
Therefore,   
 (4) Materialism is true37 
Clearly, if I do find it persuasive, such an argument for (4) gives me 
reason to believe that (4) is true. But how does this kind of evidence 
compare to intellectual seemings, for example the intuitive truth of 
Possibility and Non-Identity? Papineau's argument concludes that (4) 
is true. Possibility and Non-Identity seem true, and either are 
equivalent to or obviously entail the denial of (4). Would Papineau's 
argument, granting that we find it persuasive, provide an overriding 
or even a neutralizing rebutting defeater for our belief that (4) is 
false?   
 I believe it would not, for the same reason we should 
maintain belief that 2!1 despite the argument to the contrary above. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 Papineau uses “materialism” broadly to mean that phenomenal types 
just are physical or functional types. 
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If I judge the conjunction of the premises and inferences of 
Papineau's argument to have a sufficiently lower probability than the 
denial of the conclusion, then the argument gives me neither an 
overriding nor a neutralizing rebutting defeater. And I think it's clear 
that the conjunction of the premises and inferences of Papineau's 
argument deserves less credence than Possibility and Non-Identity. 
 Consider, for example, the main inferences of Papineau’s 
argument. Papineau believes that his premises entail his conclusion. 
After laying out the premises, he says: “Materialism now follows.” 
However, Papineau’s argument is not valid. To show this, I will 
describe a coherent view on which Papineau’s premises are true but 
his conclusion is false. I will first describe the view, and then I’ll 
explain why it isn’t a form of materialism. 
Here is the view. Suppose all sensations are irreducibly non-
material (in Papineau’s sense of “material”). At the same time, 
suppose that beliefs are completely reducible to material properties . 
And so beliefs supervene on the material facts with at least 
metaphysical necessity. All the sensations, on the other hand, 
supervene on their corresponding physical states with at most nomic 
necessity.  
Now let’s flesh out the view so that it satisfies the Causal 
Argument’s premises. Add to the view that conscious mental 
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occurrences have physical effects (so the first premise is true). Add 
also that all physical effects have prior sufficient physical causes (so 
the second premise is true). Therefore, on this view we are 
considering, much of the time the physical effects of conscious causes 
are overdetermined. For example, when the thrill of victory causes 
me to smile, my smile will have two prior sufficient causes on this 
view: the irreducibly immaterial thrill sensation and also its purely 
material correlate. But the physical effects of conscious causes are not 
always overdetermined. For example, when the belief that the Causal 
Argument is invalid causes a materialist to frown, there is no 
overdetermination.38 On this view, the belief just is part of the 
physical history of the materialist’s frown. And so the third premise 
is true on the view I am describing. 
So, all the premises of the Causal Argument come out as true 
on the view I am describing. Now consider the conclusion. Would 
materialism be true on this view I have described? Insofar as we can 
have intuitions about semi-technical terms like “dualism” and 
“materialism,” I should think it sufficiently clear that this view is not 
a form of materialism: every single sensation is irreducibly 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 If for some reason you think that occurrent beliefs do not count as 
conscious mental states, then change the view I describe thusly: nearly 
every sensation is irreducibly immaterial, except for one. The taste of 
banana, say, is reducible. It just is a brain state. When the taste of banana 
causes a subject to say “Yum!,” there is no overdetermination. In every 
other case of a physical effect of a conscious cause, however, there will be 
overdetermination. And so all three premises of Papineau’s Causal 
Argument can be true on this view. 
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immaterial. But we need not rest our case on such intuitions. Though 
it is difficult to say exactly what materialism is, many philosophers 
agree that any adequate definition should at least entail this modal 
supervenience claim: the mental supervenes on the material with 
something stronger than nomic necessity.  
That supervenience claim is false on the view I have 
described, and therefore this view is not a form of materialism. There 
are materially identical possible worlds that nevertheless differ with 
respect to mental facts. To be sure, on this view the facts about beliefs 
cannot vary unless the material facts vary. But that does not hold 
with respect to all mental states on this view. For example, on the 
view I have described it is perfectly possible to have two worlds that 
are duplicates with respect to the material facts and yet which vary 
with respect to the facts about sensations.  
Therefore, the premises of this Causal Argument could be 
true even while the conclusion is false, and so the argument is 
invalid. Now, the argument would be valid were we to strengthen 
the third premise to something like this: the physical effects of 
conscious causes are never overdetermined by distinct causes. But 
that is a substantially stronger claim than Papineau’s original 
premise, and no argument is given for this stronger version of the 
third premise. And while one might easily be skeptical of rampant 
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overdetermination, it is more difficult to get worked up about the 
suggestion that it sometimes happens. Indeed, many philosophers 
already accept that some physical effects are overdetermined. Why 
not think that the physical effects of conscious causes are 
occasionally overdetermined? Therefore, the stronger version of the 
third premise has much less going for it. By itself, the revised third 
premise is less plausible than the negation of the conclusion. For 
even stronger reasons, the conjunction of all the premises and 
inferences in Papineau’s revised argument will be less plausible than 
the negation of the conclusion. And so, even Papineau’s revised 
argument will fail to deliver an overriding or even neutralizing 
rebutting defeater for dualism. 
Even worse, the premises of Papineau’s causal argument are 
inconsistent with role functionalism and therefore, from the 
perspective of the contemporary materialist, with multiple 
realizability. Thus we have even stronger reasons to reject the 
conjunction of Papineau’s premises. What follows has the structure 
of a dilemma. Papineau considers two natural readings of the first 
premise of the Causal Argument. On the first reading, I will argue, 
role functionalism is inconsistent with the first premise. On the 
second reading, I will argue, role functionalism is inconsistent with 
the third premise. Either way, then, role functionalism is inconsistent 
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with this Causal Argument’s premises. I will end by explaining why 
this is a serious strike against the argument. 
According to role functionalism, pain is a second-order state 
defined by its functional role. Roughly, it is the state of being in some 
state or other that is typically caused by bodily injury, which 
typically causes a desire for relief, anxiety, evasive behavior, etc. This 
“some state or other” is often called the realizer of the second-order 
state. In humans, the realizer of pain is C-fibers firing (or whatever). 
In octopi, the realizer is something else. Both humans and octopi feel 
pain, according to role functionalism, because each has some state or 
other that realizes the appropriate second-order functional state.  
 Papineau (following Malcolm 1968 and Kim 1989, 1998) 
expresses concern that role functionalism is inconsistent with the first 
premise of his argument. After all, suppose we kick a human in the 
shin and he subsequently limps. “I am limping because my leg 
hurts,” he sincerely says. But could that be true, on role 
functionalism? Is it really the pain—that second-order state—that 
causes him to limp? Or is it the first-order physical realizer of the 
pain that causes him to limp? Papineau is initially inclined toward 
the latter. In a strict sense of “cause,” he says, only the first-order 
state causes the limp. The second-order functional state—i.e. the pain 
itself, on role functionalism—does not cause the limp. But according 
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to role functionalism all mental states are second-order states. And so 
what goes for pain goes for every other mental state, on role 
functionalism. And therefore conscious mental occurrences never 
have any physical effects, on role functionalism. But that is contrary 
to the first premise. Therefore, a natural reading of the first premise 
is inconsistent with role functionalism. This is the first horn of the 
dilemma for Papineau. 
 However, there are other readings of the first premise. Some 
of them are not unnatural. And some of these not unnatural readings 
are consistent with role functionalism. Papineau (2002, 32) says, for 
example, that “it is arguable that there is a perfectly normal sense of 
‘cause’ in which higher states cause the effects that their realizers 
cause.” And so he draws our attention to the following reading of the 
first premise: 
(1*) Conscious causes have physical effects, at least in the 
generous sense. 
 Role functionalism is consistent with (1*). But I will now argue that, 
on this reading of the first premise, role functionalism is inconsistent 
with the third premise of the Causal Argument, i.e. the premise that 
the physical effects of conscious causes are not always 
overdetermined by distinct causes. This is the second horn of the 
dilemma for Papineau.  
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 On this generous sense of ‘cause’, it turns out that pain might 
be a second-order functional state and still cause physical effects. As 
Papineau (2002, 32) says, “my taking an aspirin can still be caused by 
the pain in my head, in virtue of being caused by whichever strictly 
physical state realizes that pain in me.” But then there are two 
nomically sufficient causes of the aspirin-taking. And, one might 
think, if an event E has two distinct nomically sufficient causes C1 
and C2, then E is overdetermined. It would follow, then, that my 
aspirin taking is overdetermined. And what goes for pain and 
aspirin-taking seems to hold generally. Therefore, it looks as though 
the physical effects of conscious causes will always be 
overdetermined on role functionalism given this generous sense of 
‘cause’. But that is inconsistent with the third premise of the main 
argument. Therefore, even on this more generous reading of the first 
premise, the Causal Argument is inconsistent with role 
functionalism. That concludes the second horn of the dilemma for 
Papineau. Let me now defend the second horn from an objection 
from Papineau. 
 Papineau is aware of the worry that constitutes the second 
horn of the dilemma. In response, he would deny the above principle 
that if an event E has two distinct nomically sufficient causes C1 and C2, 
then E is overdetermined. He would insist that merely having two 
nomically sufficient causes is insufficient for overdetermination, 
 107!
since it is also necessary that these causes satisfy certain 
counterfactuals. Here is what he says (2002, 33):  
The higher cause is present only in virtue of the physical 
cause which realizes it. In the circumstances, the one would 
be absent if the other were. And because of this, we have no 
trouble with the counterfactuals which would be indicative of 
genuine overdetermination. It is not true that the behavioural 
result would still have been caused even if the physical 
realizer had been absent, for the higher state would then have 
been absent too; and similarly, if the higher state had been 
absent in some particular case, there would again have been 
no alternative cause for the behavioural result, since the 
physical realizer would have had to be absent too. 
I will now reconstruct Papineau’s argument for the conclusion that 
(1*)-(3) are consistent with role functionalism. I will then show how 
the argument fails. Thus will the second horn of the dilemma for 
Papineau remain compelling. 
 Consider again the case in which my taking an aspirin is 
caused by the pain in my head in virtue of (as Papineau says) being 
caused by whichever strictly physical state realizes that pain in me. 
According to Papineau 
(A) If the physical realizer had not occurred, the pain would 
not have occurred. 
And therefore, says Papineau, 
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(B) It is false that I still would have taken aspirin even if the 
physical realizer had not occurred.  
Similarly, Papineau says, 
(C) If the pain had not occurred, the physical realizer would 
also not have occurred. 
And therefore, says Papineau, 
(D) It is false that I still would have taken the aspirin even if 
the pain had not occurred. 
Putting (B) and (D) together, we get 
(E) It is false that (EITHER I still would have taken the aspirin 
even if the pain had been absent OR I still would have taken 
aspirin even if the physical realizer had been absent). 
And from (E) we are meant to draw the final conclusion that 
(F) My taking the aspirin is not overdetermined by my pain 
and the physical realizer of my pain. 
In the move from (E) to (F), Papineau assumes the following 
universal principle: 
(G) Any effect E is overdetermined by any causes C1 and C2 
only if (EITHER E still would have occurred even if C1 had 
not occurred OR E still would have occurred even if C2 had not 
occurred) 
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That is, Papineau places a necessary condition on overdetermination. 
This condition may not be met even if an effect has two distinct 
nomically sufficient causes. On role functionalism, in the case of 
physical effects of conscious causes, this condition is not met. This is 
why Papineau believes that role functionalism is consistent with 
premises (1*)-(3).  
 Here is my criticism of this argument: principle (G) is false. 
The condition Papineau takes to be necessary for overdetermination 
is not necessary. To show that principle (G) is false, I will describe a 
clear instance of overdetermination. Then, I use inferences that 
Papineau himself accepts to argue that the disjunctive consequent of 
principle (G) is not met in the instance of overdetermination I have 
described.  
Here is a description of a clear instance of overdetermination. 
Suppose a widely held variety of dualism is true: all mental states are 
irreducibly immaterial, but the mental supervenes on the material 
with nomic necessity. Add to this view that at least some mental 
states have only one subvenient base. That is, for at least one mental 
state M, there is only one material state that synchronically nomically 
necessitates M. Let’s say that pain is one of these mental states, and 
let’s say that C-fibers firing is pain’s only subvenient base. Given the 
laws of nature, the only way to produce pain is for C-fibers to fire: no 
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C-fibers firing, no pain. It will follow on this view, then, that C-fibers 
firing is nomically sufficient and necessary for pain.  
Now suppose that every physical event has a prior sufficient 
physical cause. Suppose also that conscious mental occurrences have 
physical effects. Those physical effects of conscious mental 
occurrences will therefore clearly be overdetermined: for each, there 
will be a prior sufficient physical cause and also a distinct prior 
sufficient mental cause. Consider, for instance, the pain that causes 
me to wince. On this dualist view, my wincing has two distinct 
sufficient causes: the pain and also the C-fibers firing. If this isn’t 
overdetermination, nothing is. 
So much for the clear case of overdetermination. Now turn 
your attention to the disjunctive consequent of (G). Using only 
inferences that Papineau himself accepts, I will now argue that even 
in this clear case of overdetermination the relevant instance of the 
consequent of (G) is false. Principle (G) will therefore be refuted by 
counterexample.  
Focus on the wincing example I just mentioned. On this 
dualist view, C-fibers firing is nomically necessary for pain: it is 
pain’s only subvenient base. On this view, then, it will be true that  
(A*) If C-fibers firing had not occurred, the pain would not 
have occurred. 
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Given the truth of this dualist view, worlds in which there are no C-
fibers firing and yet there is pain are worlds with different laws of 
nature from ours. Surely, therefore, there are worlds that are ‘closer’ 
or ‘more similar’ to ours in the relevant senses in which there are no 
C-fibers firing and also no pain occurring, worlds that do not involve 
miracles. And therefore (A) is true. 
Since he endorsed the inference from (A) to (B) above, 
Papineau should accept that (A*) entails 
(B*) It is false that I still would have winced even if the C-
fibers firing had not occurred.  
Similarly, since C-fibers firing is nomically sufficient for pain, it will 
be true on this dualist view that 
(C*) If the pain had not occurred, C-fibers firing would also 
not have occurred. 
Given the truth of this dualist view, worlds in which there is no pain 
and yet there are C-fibers firing are worlds with different laws of 
nature from ours. Surely, therefore, there are worlds that are ‘closer’ 
or ‘more similar’ to ours in the relevant senses in which there is no 
pain and also no C-fibers firing, worlds that do not involve miracles. 
Therefore (C*) is true.  
Since he endorsed the inference from (C) to (D) above, 
Papineau should accept that it follows from (C*) that 
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(D*) It is false that I still would have winced even if the pain 
had not occurred. 
Putting (B*) and (D*) together, we get 
(E*) It is false that (EITHER I still would have winced even if the 
pain had been absent OR I still would have winced even if the C-
fibers firing had not occurred). 
But this is the negation of the consequent of the relevant instance of 
general principle (G). And that is what we were trying to prove. 
Principle (G) is therefore refuted by counterexample. 
 We have described a view on which my wincing clearly 
involves overdetermination, and yet the wincing does not meet the 
necessary condition that Papineau proposes for overdetermination. 
Therefore the condition that Papineau proposes as necessary for 
overdetermination is not necessary. But this condition on 
overdetermination was the only reason that Papineau proposed in 
favor of thinking that role functionalism would not involve 
overdetermination using his generous sense of ‘cause’, and so would 
be consistent with his premises (1*)-(3). Therefore, Papineau has 
given us no good reason to believe that role functionalism is 
consistent with premises (1*)-(3).  
But at the same time we have a good reason to think that role 
functionalism is not consistent with premises (1*)-(3): given the 
 113!
generous sense of ‘cause’ involved in (1*), it comes out on role 
functionalism that the effects of conscious events will always have 
two distinct sufficient causes. Plausibly, if an effect E has two distinct 
sufficient causes C1 and C2, then E is overdetermined. Therefore, it 
will come out on role functionalism together with the generous sense 
of ‘cause’ involved in (1*) that the effects of conscious causes are 
always overdetermined by distinct causes.  And that is inconsistent 
with premise (3). Therefore, role functionalism is inconsistent with 
premises (1*)-(3). This, recall, is the second horn of the dilemma for 
Papineau. 
 I have already shown how role functionalism is inconsistent 
with (1), a natural reading of the Causal Argument’s first premise. 
We have now seen how role functionalism is inconsistent with (1*)-
(3), where (1*) is a more generous reading of the Causal Argument’s 
first premise. Since no other readings of that first premise are on the 
table, I conclude that role functionalism is inconsistent with 
Papineau’s version of the Causal Argument for materialism. 
 This is a significant result, for many materialists believe that, 
qua materialists, their only live options are brain state identity theory, 
realizer functionalism, and role functionalism. These materialists are 
pushed toward role functionalism by considerations of multiple 
realizability. If other species with radically different neural structures 
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can nevertheless share our exact mental state types, then brain state 
identity theory and realizer functionalism are both false. And if those 
two theories are false, they reason, then role functionalism must be 
true. And if role functionalism is false, they contrapose, then multiple 
realizability is impossible.  
Yet we have just learned that if Papineau’s version of the 
Causal Argument is sound, then role functionalism is false. And 
therefore a materialist ought to conclude that if Papineau’s Causal 
Argument is sound, multiple realizability is impossible. The 
apparent possibility of multiple realizability, therefore, provides the 
materialist with a rebutting defeater for Papineau’s version of the 
Causal Argument. If a materialist is strongly inclined, as I am, to 
believe that other species with radically different neural structures 
can nevertheless share our exact mental state types, the materialist 
should reject Papineau’s version of the Causal Argument for 
materialism. 
In conclusion, we learned in the first section that Papineau’s 
version of the Causal Argument is valid only if the physical effects of 
conscious causes are never overdetermined by distinct causes. If you 
think it possible that the physical effects of conscious causes are at 
least sometimes overdetermined, you should reject Papineau’s 
argument as unsound.  
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My second objection showed that, from the perspective of 
many materialists, Papineau’s version of the Causal Argument is 
sound only if other species with radically different neural structures 
cannot share our exact mental state types. If you are a materialist who 
finds plausible the multiple realizability of mental states, you should 
reject Papineau’s version of the Causal Argument as unsound. 
We have here, then, two new reasons to reject this Causal 
Argument as unsound. Even if we had not found these flaws in the 
argument, it is plausible that the strength of our dualist intuitions 
would still have justified us in rejecting the conjunction of Papineau’s 
premises. But given the flaws we have discovered, we are justified to 
an even greater degree in rejecting the conjunction of Papineau’s 
premises.  
And what goes for Papineau’s argument for non-dualism also 
goes for every other argument for non-dualism and objection to 
dualism. Therefore, we have here a general strategy for responding 
to proposed rebutting defeaters to dualism. Even if one cannot find 
any flaws in the proposed rebutting defeaters for dualism that I 
sketched above, so long as one finds Possibility and Non-Identity 
more plausible than the conjunction of the premises and inferences of 
each of the proposed rebutting defeaters, none of them will succeed. 
However, in many cases one might find a premise or inference that is 
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particularly dubious. Take Jaegwon Kim’s Pairing Problem. First, the 
conclusion is consistent with a dualism about property types; it is 
only a problem for substance dualism.  Second, the argument is a 
problem only for those varieties of substance dualism that accept that 
souls are not spatially located. The Pairing Problem should not 
trouble a dualist who is willing to jettison that assumption. Take also 
the inductive argument for non-dualism: it will rely on something 
like the assumption that there are no relevant differences between 
phenomena that are uncontroversially physical and mental 
phenomena. Anyone remotely attracted to Possibility and Non-
Identity will have reason to reject that assumption. A similar 
response can be given to Stoljar’s methodological argument for non-
dualism. Now take the simplicity argument for non-dualism. It will 
rely on something like the assumption that non-dualism and dualism 
explain the data equally well, and thus are candidates for Occam’s 
Razor. Again, anyone remotely moved by Possibility and Non-
Identity will think that dualism has a serious advantage over non-
dualism, namely that dualism does justice to these intuitions while 
non-dualism denies them. Zimmerman’s objection to dualism relies 
on a small army of assumptions, many of which are less plausible 
than Possibility and Non-Identity, and the conjunction of which 
certainly is. These include the assumption that substance dualism is 
false. It is an argument meant to move the mere property dualist 
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towards substance dualism. A substance dualist will, therefore, be 
unmoved by this argument. Similarly with Adam’s objection: it is 
meant to be an objection to atheistic dualism. A theist will not be 
moved by this argument. And a firmly atheistic dualist will likely 
find Possibility and Non-Identity more plausible than the 
conjunction of Adam’s myriad other assumptions. 
These are brief remarks on each argument, but for a natural 
reason. The general strategy requires only that we evaluate the 
conjunction of premises for any argument for non-dualism or 
objection to dualism. If that conjunction is less plausible than 
Possibility or Non-Identity, then the proposed rebutting defeater is 
defused. We need not locate any particular error; we need not know 
exactly where the argument goes wrong. It is sufficient to note that 
there must be an error somewhere, given the high probability of 
Possibility and Non-Identity vis-à-vis the conjunction of the rebutting 
defeater’s premises. Locating especially dubious premises is an 
unnecessary bonus. 
J.J.C Smart (1959, 143), an ardent non-dualist, agrees with the 
general methodology here. Speaking of the entities and relations 
posited by dualism, he says “If any philosophical arguments seemed 
to compel us to believe in such things, I would suspect a catch in the 
argument.” Though our respective prior probabilities in dualism and 
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materialism differ significantly, we agree that, when confronted with 
an argument for a seriously improbable conclusion, the right attitude 
is to suspect a catch in the argument. 
 So it goes with powerful but abstruse arguments in which the 
conjunction of the premises and inferences deserves less credence 
than the negation of the conclusion. But could a philosophical 
argument ever be so powerful as to provide more than a merely 
diminishing rebutting defeater for a proposition that intellectually 
seems obviously true? To answer that, suppose that someone–
perhaps inspired by the Pythagoreans–presents you with a subtle but 
extremely powerful argument for the conclusion that numbers are 
the ultimate reality, and that therefore 
 (5) The Prime Minister is a prime number. 
Suppose that, try as you might, you can't find any particular fault 
with the argument. We have already established that if the 
conjunction of premises and inferences in the argument deserves less 
credence than the denial of the conclusion, then this argument does 
not give you an overriding or neutralizing rebutting defeater for 
your intuitive belief that 
(6) It is not the case that the Prime Minister is a prime number. 
Perhaps this Pythagorean argument would give you pause for 
thought, and perhaps you ought to continue to grapple with the 
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argument. Perhaps it would even give you a diminishing rebutting 
defeater. Yet in order to take this Pythagorean argument as evidence 
for (5), one must take the argument to have true premises and a valid 
inference, i.e. one must believe 
 (7) This Pythagorean argument is sound. 
If one takes (6) to have more going for it than (7), then she does not 
have an overriding or neutralizing rebutting defeater for her belief 
that (6). 
 Could the evidence in favor of (5) and evidence in favor of (6) 
ever be on a par, such that the right attitude is to suspend judgment? 
Could there be circumstances in which this Pythagorean argument is 
a neutralizing rebutting defeater for (6)? Suppose that each premise of 
the Pythagorean argument is as intuitively obvious as (6), and that 
the inference from the premises of the Pythagorean argument to (5) is 
as intuitively obvious as (6). (Let’s grant that we can't have Cartesian 
certainty about the premises of the Pythagorean argument, or the 
validity of the inference, or even (6), so let's say we judge their 
individual probabilities to be just less than 1.) It would be a 
remarkable achievement for any interesting philosophical argument 
to have premises and inferences each of which is as subjectively 
probable as (6). Let's say that under these conditions, this 
Pythagorean argument is a knock-down argument.   
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 While the premises and the inference from premises to 
conclusion may individually be as intuitively obvious as (6), (7) itself 
will not be as credible as (6). After all, in order to take (7) as evidence 
for (5) in a way that could actually give (6) a run for its money, one 
must believe a conjunctive proposition, namely that each of the 
premises of the Pythagorean argument is true, and the inference from 
the premises to (5) is valid. And one must believe these conjuncts on 
the basis of intuition.39  
But this conjunctive claim is logically stronger than each 
conjunct individually. So the credence that it deserves is a product of 
the probabilities of the individual conjuncts. And this product must 
be lower than the credence deserved by each conjunct individually.40 
And we've already supposed that each conjunct deserves as much 
credence as (6). Therefore, even if the Pythagorean argument were a 
knock-down argument, the evidence supplied by the Pythagorean 
argument in favor of (5) (taken as such) would still be inferior to our 
evidence in favor of (6), and therefore (6) would still not deserve as 
much credence as (6). Therefore, the Pythagorean argument could 
supply neither an overriding nor a neutralizing defeater for (6), even 
if the argument were a knock-down argument.   
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39 As opposed to, say, believing (7) on the basis of testimony, in which case 
we certainly wouldn't have a neutralizing rebutting defeater. 
40
  At least if you judge the conjuncts to be anything less than certain, i.e. if 
you judge their probability to be anything less than 1.0. 
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 Let's now return to Papineau's Causal Argument. Papineau's 
argument is not a knock-down argument by any stretch of the 
imagination, but the last paragraph shows that even if all the 
premises in Papineau's argument and the inference from the 
premises to the conclusion were as intuitively obvious as Possibility 
and Non-Identity, still we would only get at most a diminishing 
rebutting defeater. The same line of reasoning would apply to any 
argument for any of the reductive type-identity theories. 
Importantly, the same line of reasoning would apply to any objection 
to dualism, i.e. any argument for the conclusion that dualism is false 
using commitments of dualism as premises. 
 
Conclusion 
 In conclusion, then, someone to whom Possibility and Non-
Identity seem obviously true can rest her dualism on firm ground. 
For such a person, even if there are powerful philosophical 
arguments for the conclusion that one of reductive type-identity 
views is true, or powerful philosophical objections to the truth of 
dualism, the fact that Possibility and Non-Identity intellectually seem 
so obvious, combined with the fact that this clear, intuitive seeming 
has not been undercut, make the standards for success for an 
overriding or even neutralizing rebutting defeater extremely high. 
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Even if the argument or objection were knock-down – i.e. the 
premises and inference from premises to conclusion are each as 
intuitively obvious as Possibility and Non-Identity – it would only 
give the dualist at most a diminishing rebutting defeater, and 
(supposing the initial subjective probability of dualism were 
sufficiently high) the right attitude to take would still be dualism. 
The only threat to the dualist is the dim prospect of an argument for 
non-dualism or an objection to dualism with a conjunction of 
premises and inferences that is more credible than the disjunction of 
Possibility or Non-Identity. At least in my case, none of the 
arguments we’ve surveyed meets this high standard, and none seems 
forthcoming. 
Perhaps if we had any clear intuitions that a type-identity 
theory is true, then we would have a neutralizing rebutting defeater 
and the right position would be suspension of judgment. Or perhaps 
if we had an argument for a type-identity theory or an objection to 
dualism in which at least one premise (or the inference from the 
premises to the conclusion) were more intuitively obvious than 
Possibility or Non-Identity, then perhaps we would have a 
neutralizing or even overriding rebutting defeater for our dualist 
intuitions (depending on just how much more obvious the premise 
or inference were, and how many premises there were).  
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 But we clearly don't have any intuitions that some reductive 
type-identity theory is true – none is just obvious. Philosophers tend 
to accept reductive type-identity theories on the basis of some 
philosophical argument.41,42 But given the intuitive truth of 
Possibility and Non-Identity, it may well be that no such argument 
can justify belief in any reductive type-identity theory; no such 
argument that I have seen (or even heard the faintest rumor of) can 
even justify suspension of belief. The right attitude is therefore belief 
in dualism, even if we had access to a knock-down argument for a 
type-identity theory or a knock-down objection to dualism.43
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41 Papineau agrees that it takes more than intuition to justify materialism 
(2002, 36-38). What's needed, he says, is an argument in favor of 
materialism. 
42 Or perhaps Tyler Burge (1993) is correct when he says that the 
naturalistic picture of the world is more like a political or religious 
ideology than like a position well supported by the evidence, and that 
materialism is an article of faith based on the worship of science. 
43
 Perhaps no single proposed rebutting defeater can override our dualist intuitions. 
But what about the disjunction of all the proposals? Or what about the proposals 
considered as a series, each one chipping away at our confidence in dualism? 
Here things get complicated. It may well be that Possibility and Non-Identity 
strike you as maximally obvious—like the claim that pain isn’t euphoria, or pain 
isn’t the property of being a misaligned floorboard. If so, there will be no 
“chipping away” at your dualism. But suppose you take Possibility and Non-
Identity as less than absolutely certain. It may well be that a sufficiently robust 
series of proposed rebutting defeaters could, in the end, override your dualism. I 
suppose this is what has in fact happened with those many non-dualists who 
admit to having dualist intuitions. Each of us must do the math in his or her own 
case, assigning probabilities to Possibility and Non-Identity, and then to the 
premises and inferences of each proposed rebutting defeater. In my case, 
dualism survives the onslaught. Perhaps the same goes for you. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
An Argument for Dualism from the Nature of 
Introspection 
 
In the previous three chapters, we have developed a methodological 
argument for dualism. In this chapter, I will set that argument aside 
and present a novel argument for the view that I am not a complex 
thing, and so not a complex physical object like a brain or a body.  
In 1962, Kurt Baier argued that materialism about the mind 
entails introspective fallibility, e.g. that you might be wrong that you 
are in pain at a time when it seems to you that you are in pain. Since 
very many philosophers at the time accepted introspective 
infallibility, this was a significant result. In response, materialists like 
David Armstrong (1963) squared their shoulders, accepted the 
implication, and haven’t looked back. These days, it is hard to find a 
philosopher who accepts that introspection is infallible.  
Even so, most contemporary philosophers believe that 
introspection is not hyperfallible. Introspection might get it somewhat 
wrong, they think, but introspection can’t get it radically wrong. It 
couldn’t be, for example, that I am actually experiencing fierce pain 
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right now though it introspectively seems to me that I am not. In this 
paper, I will extend Baier’s argument to target this popular view. I 
will argue, roughly, that each of the standard accounts of 
introspection on which it is mechanistic—that is, a causal series of 
events extended in time—entails introspective hyperfallibility. If any 
one of the standard accounts of introspection is right, then we never 
have introspective certainty—every last one of our introspective 
beliefs is defeasible. This implication, I take it, is far less palatable 
than the one Baier pointed out.  
Furthermore, I will argue that any version of what I call “the 
Complex View”—including the standard materialist view on which 
people are complex material objects like bodies or brains—entails 
that introspection might be mechanistic. What follows, I will argue, is 
that the Complex View forces open the possibility that none of our 
introspective beliefs is certain for us. Philosophers who believe that is 
not an open possibility will consider this to be a powerful argument 
against the Complex View—they will think certainty teaches us that 
the standard materialist view of human persons is false, and that 
human persons are simple.
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1. The Main Argument 
I am some thing. Many people think that I am a complex thing—a 
thing with parts—and that my mental life is (or is a result of) the 
interaction of some of these parts. Which complex thing am I? 
Perhaps I am a body, or perhaps some part of a body such as a 
brain, or perhaps some special part of a brain. Other people think 
that I am not a complex thing at all. Rather, these people say that I 
am a simple thing—a thing with no parts—and my mental life is a 
basic activity of this simple thing, not a result of the interaction of 
any parts.44  
In this paper, I will develop and defend a novel argument 
that may be used to support the Simple View: 
(1) Supposing that the Complex View is true, I cannot be 
certain45 that introspection46 is not a causal series of events 
extended in time.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
44 See, for example, Roderick Chisholm (1991) and, more recently, David 
Barnett (2010). Earlier in his career, Chisholm (1978) took seriously 
the possibility that we are material simples, though he stopped short 
of endorsing the view. 
45. A proposition p is certain for a subject S just in case S is entitled to 
believe p, come what may. That is, S’s grounds for p make it such that 
no additional evidence should lower her credence in p. By “p is 
certain for S” I do not mean “it is psychologically impossible for S to 
doubt that p.” Rather, I mean the normative notion “S cannot 
rationally doubt p.” I mean what many have called “absolute” or 
“Cartesian” certainty. When a subject has this kind of certainty, her 
belief is often said to be “Demon-proof” after Descartes’ deus deceptor. 
46. There are many ways a subject might come to have beliefs about the 
phenomenal character of her own experiences. Introspection is that 
way to which the subject has privileged access (normally, at least). 
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(2) If introspection is a causal series of events extended in 
time, then I could gain good evidence that I am feeling 
fierce pain right now.47 
(3) For any propositions p and q, if (i) I cannot be certain 
that p is false, and (ii) p entails q, then I cannot be certain 
that q is false. 
(4) So, supposing that the Complex View is true, I cannot 
be certain that I could not gain good evidence that I am 
feeling fierce pain right now.  
If you think it is more likely that the Complex View is false than that 
you cannot be certain that you couldn’t gain good evidence that you’re in 
fierce pain, then (1)-(4) constitute an argument for the conclusion 
that the Complex View is false. Let me now explain and motivate 
the premises and then respond to three objections. 
 
2. Introspection as a Causal Series of Events Extended in Time 
Visual perception is a process, a series of events extended 
in time whereby one comes to have beliefs about how the world 
is. We commonly take this to be a causal series of events extended 
in time: each member of this series of events is merely nomically 
sufficient for the next, and each member of this series could 
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47. That is, I could gain evidence that would make it reasonable for me to 
believe that I am experiencing fierce pain, even though I continue to 
token just this type of experience, which introspectively seems to me 
not to involve any pain at all. 
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occupy a point or duration of time distinct from that of any other 
member in this series. For example, we think some story like this 
is now true of you: There is a surface with markings before you. 
This surface and these markings cause light to be reflected in a 
certain way into your eyes. This reflected light causes certain 
events on your retinas. These retinal events cause certain events in 
your optic nerve. These optic nerve events cause certain events in 
your visual cortex. Then you enjoy a visual experience, which 
represents (among other things) that there is a white surface with 
black markings before you. 
Like visual perception, introspection is a process, a series 
of events extended in time. Unlike visual perception however, 
introspection is a process by which one becomes aware not of the 
external world, but rather of the phenomenal character of her own 
experiences. For example, we think some story like this is now 
true of you: You have a visual experience, which represents that 
there is a white surface with black markings before you. Then you 
attend to some of the phenomenal character of your experience – 
the whiteness, say. And then, somehow, you end up with the 
belief (or awareness, or perception) that you are having a visual 
experience as of white. Many people think that introspection, like 
visual perception, is a causal series of events, involving some sort 
of mechanism. For example, Alex Byrne (2005) writes: “[U]nless it’s 
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magic, I must have some sort of mechanism (perhaps more than 
one) for detecting my own mental states—something rather like 
my visual, auditory, and gustatory systems, although directed to 
my mental life.” I will first discuss some mechanistic views of 
introspection before arguing for the premises of the Main 
Argument. 
 
3. Some Mechanistic Views of Introspection 
My introspective awareness that I am having a visual 
experience as of white stands in some relation to that visual 
experience itself. There are many views of introspection on which 
some causal mechanism takes the first-order state as input and 
delivers the introspective state as output. On these views, some 
sort of temporally extended causal chain leads from the first-order 
state to the introspective state.  
David Armstrong’s and William Lycan’s Inner Sense 
Model of introspection is one of these views. According to Lycan 
(2003) “...introspection is the operation of an internal attention 
mechanism that monitors experiences and produces second-order 
representations of their properties...” These second-order 
representations are importantly similar to ordinary perceptions, 
and thus this view has become known as the Higher-Order 
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Perception (HOP) view of introspection. Lycan says introspection 
makes us aware of our experiences and their properties, as 
perception makes us aware of external objects (like bottle rockets) 
and their properties. That is, introspection is a mechanism that 
delivers second-order perceptions that there is an experience that 
there is such and such, just as visual perception is a mechanism 
that delivers first-order perceptions that there is such and such. For 
my purposes, it is important to note only that (i) if the Complex 
View is true, I cannot be certain that introspection does not work 
this way, and (ii) on this view introspection is a temporally 
extended causal chain—mediated by this internal attention 
mechanism—leading from experiences to distinct second-order 
representations of their properties.  
Consider now a Higher-Order Thought (HOT) view of 
introspective awareness advocated by Sydney Shoemaker (1994), 
David Rosenthal (2004), Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich (2003), 
among many others. On this view, introspection is the process by 
which we come to have non-perceptual second-order self-
attributions about our first-order mental states. According to 
Shoemaker, these second-order states are beliefs. And the brain 
state associated with the first-order mental state causes the brain 
state associated with the belief about it. According to Rosenthal, a 
mental state is conscious only if it is accompanied by a distinct, 
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occurrent HOT. Right now, I am conscious that there is a white 
surface before me; the visual representation is accompanied by 
that HOT. In introspection we become conscious of our 
consciousness; that HOT itself comes to have—via a causal 
process extended in time—an accompanying HOT. I become 
conscious that I am conscious that there is a white surface before 
me. 
A variant HOT theory was put to me by Michael Tye, 
though I do not know how seriously he takes it. On what we may 
call a “Read-Write Model,” there is a consciousness-compartment 
(C-box) in the mind, in addition to a belief-compartment (B-box). 
When one’s experience represents that p, the sentence “p” (in the 
language of thought) is inscribed in the C-box. Introspection is a 
mechanism and one of its jobs is to read sentences inscribed in the 
C-box and write corresponding sentences in the belief-box, e.g. “I 
am aware that p.” For my purposes, it is important to note only 
that (i) if the Complex View is true, I cannot be certain that 
introspection does not work this way, and (ii) on all these 
variations of HOT theory, introspection is a temporally extended 
causal chain leading from some type of first-order state to a 
distinct second-order representation of it.   
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Finally, let us consider Same-Order Monitoring Theory 
(SOMT) advocated by Uriah Kriegel,48 and by some accounts 
Franz Brentano. According to Kriegel (2007, 370), a visual 
experience as of green (call that mental state “M”) is a “complex” 
of a visual representation of green (call that “M1”) bundled with 
the awareness of M1, i.e. an appropriate representation of M1 (call 
this state “M2”). In virtue of being represented by M2, M1 is 
conscious, and M is a visual experience as of green rather than a 
mere representation. Kriegel seems to agree that the first-order 
state does not represent itself as being represented. Rather, that is 
what introspection does.  
There are a few plausible ways introspection might work 
on Kriegel’s view. It may be that a higher-order representation 
either of M2 or of M is not part of the complex M, but is brought 
about by some causal mechanism. Alternatively, it may be that the 
complex target state M comes to have as a constituent a 
representation of M2, via some causal mechanism (cf. Rosenthal 
2004, 33). For my purposes, it is important to note only that (i) if 
the Complex View is true, I cannot be certain that introspection 
does not work this way, and (ii) on any of these plausible SOMT 
views of introspection, introspection is a temporally extended 
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48. What I say here is also applicable mutatis mutandis to Intrinsic 
Higher-Order Thought Theory advocated by Genarro (1996) and 
Natsoulas (1996). 
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causal chain leading from some type of first-order state to a 
distinct representation of it.  
 
4. Support for Premise (1) in the Main Argument 
 Recall the first premise of the Main Argument: 
(1) Supposing that the Complex View is true, I cannot be 
certain that introspection is not a causal series of events 
extended in time.  
Let me now support this premise. I take it that none of the views 
discussed in the previous section is obviously false, at least on the 
assumption that I am a brain or some other complex object. After 
all, if I suppose that I am a brain and that my mental states 
supervene on the physical states of that brain, then it may be that 
the physical states on which the mental states that constitute 
introspection supervene are a temporally extended causal chain. If 
so, it may be that the supervening mental states that constitute 
introspection are a temporally extended causal chain. The theories 
discussed in the previous section are reasonable explanations of 
how introspection might work, given these assumptions. 
 To put it somewhat more vividly, suppose you are a brain. 
Given that assumption, there is evidence I could give you to make 
it reasonable for you to believe that introspection works as, for 
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example, the Read-Write Model suggests. Say I pop open your 
skull and show you the goings-on therein: if you just are that 
brain, and your mental life is intimately related to various events 
in that brain, couldn’t it be that there is, say, a read-write 
introspective mechanism in there? On the assumption that you are 
a brain, you cannot rule out this theory from the armchair—this 
theory is clearly broadly logically possible. And the same goes for 
the other theories of introspection as well, each of which suggests 
that introspection is a temporally extended causal chain. On the 
assumption that the Complex View is true, none of these theories 
is a priori knowably false. You may believe that one or more are 
false, but this belief can’t be absolutely certain for you. Since this is 
all premise (1) in the Main Argument claims, we should accept it. 
 
5. Support for Premise (2) in the Main Argument 
 Recall the second premise of the Main Argument: 
(2) If introspection is a causal series of events extended in 
time, then I could gain good evidence that I am feeling 
fierce pain right now. 
Let me now support this premise. Consider first visual perception. 
Because visual perception involves a causal series of events 
extended in time—because, that is, it is mechanistic—it is subject 
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to radical correction and none of its deliverances is certain for you. 
After all, it is metaphysically possible for any causal series of 
events to go (very) awry, and to lead to a (very) statistically 
abnormal, improper, or inapt result.49 And in any case of visual 
perception, I could present you with evidence that would make it 
reasonable to believe that the causal chain has in fact gone (very) 
awry, and that your visual experience (really badly) misrepresents 
the way the world is. 
For example, though your current visual experience 
represents that there is a white surface with black markings before 
you, there is evidence I could give you that would make it 
reasonable for you to believe that your mechanism of visual 
perception has malfunctioned, and that actually there is only a red 
surface with green markings before you (so the causal chain has 
gone awry), or that actually there is no surface and no markings at 
all (so the causal chain has gone very awry). The well-rehearsed 
stories involve the usual suspects: malevolent neurosurgeons from 
Alpha Centauri, an Evil Demon, hallucinogenic drugs, etc. In 
general, since visual perception is mechanistic, for any possible 
visual experience E you may have, though E represents that the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
49. Michael Tooley (2008, 97), I think, would agree. He says: “assuming 
that at least some of the basic causal laws of our world are 
probabilistic, any physical structure is capable of not functioning 
properly, and so any capacities based on a physical structure could 
always fail.” 
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world is a certain way, it could be that the world is different from 
how E represents it to be, even radically different. No matter how 
things visually seem, we recognize the possibility that things are 
not as they seem. Things may even be very different from how 
they seem to us, if someone is tampering with our visual 
mechanisms in the right way. 
And why should the same inference not hold in the case of 
introspection, if it too is mechanistic?50  If introspection is a causal 
series of events extended in time, and any causal series of events 
could go (very) awry, introspection is also subject to radical 
correction and none of its deliverances is certain for you. On any 
occasion of operation, the physically-realized introspective 
mechanism could malfunction, and could deliver (very) false self-
ascriptions, second-order beliefs, second-order perceptions, or 
whatever output your favored theory suggests. If introspection is 
only in the business of delivering the awareness or thought or 
perception or belief that I am experiencing that p, then if I come to 
believe that my introspective mechanism is malfunctioning, or 
that the causal process has gone awry, then the deliverances of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50. D.M. Armstrong (1963) seems to think it does: “I shall defend the 
thesis…that mental states are…states of the brain. Now if I accept the 
existence of introspection, as I also do, then I must conceive of both 
introspection and the objects of introspection as states of the brain. 
Introspection must be a self-scanning process in the brain. That it is 
logically possible that such a self-scanning process will yield wrong 
results is at once clear…” 
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that mechanism are subject to radical correction. Just as I accept 
the possibility that things are very different from how they 
visually seem (since visual perception is mechanistic), I ought to 
accept the possibility that things are very different from how they 
introspectively seem, if introspection is mechanistic. 
Consider the Read-Write Model of introspection discussed 
above. Assuming it is operating according to a good design plan, 
if the mechanism is functioning properly and reads the sentence 
“p” in the C-box (i.e. the Consciousness-Box), it writes “I am 
aware that p” in the B-box (i.e. the Belief-Box). But it is in principle 
possible to manipulate the mechanism such that it is no longer 
functioning properly, such that it for example reads “p” in the C-
box and writes “I am aware that not-p” in the B-box. Assuming 
that my brain realizes this mechanism, a sufficiently clever 
neurosurgeon could in principle manipulate my introspective 
mechanism in this way.  
Therefore, according to the Read-Write Model, on any 
occasion in which my introspective mechanism has inscribed “I 
am aware that not-p” in my B-box, I could gain evidence which 
would make it reasonable for me to believe that I am actually 
aware that p. It might go like this, on the assumption that the 
Complex View is true: first, I gain evidence that makes it 
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reasonable to believe that I am the victim of a fiendish 
neurosurgeon. Then, I gain evidence that makes it reasonable to 
believe that I have an introspective read-write mechanism, and 
that this neurosurgeon is causing it to malfunction in so that, 
though there is fierce pain is written in my C-box, only I am aware 
that it’s not the case that there is fierce pain is written in my B-box.51 
In such an instance, it would be reasonable for me to believe that 
my introspective beliefs are radically false. Though it would 
surely introspectively seem that I am not in fierce pain, in this case 
I would have good reason to believe that things are not as they 
introspectively seem. 
And so it follows that, on the Read-Write Model, I could 
gain evidence that would make it reasonable for me to believe that 
I am feeling fierce pain right now. Similar considerations apply to 
the other versions of HOT including Shoemaker's model,52 to the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
51. If one is concerned with immaterialist versions of the Complex View, 
the evidence gained here could be about an Evil Demon rather than a 
neurosurgeon. 
52. On Shoemaker's view, it may be that the experience of pain is such 
that, in certain circumstances, it necessarily causes the second-order 
self-attribution I am aware that there’s pain, and it may be such that this 
second-order self-attribution is such that, in the absence of malfunction, 
it is caused by the first-order state. But a sufficiently clever 
neurosurgeon could manipulate one's brain to produce malfunction, 
to produce a circumstance that is not one of those in which the 
experience of pain necessarily causes the second-order self-
attribution. Thus the neurosurgeon could manipulate my brain such 
that, though my experience represents that p, I form via introspection 
the belief that I am not aware that p. 
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Inner Sense Model,53 and to SOMT.54 In fact the point generalizes 
to any view of introspection according to which it is a causal series 
of events extended in time. And therefore we should accept 
premise (2) of the Main Argument. Having now supported that 
premise, let me move on to premise (3). 
 
6. Support for Premise (3) in the Main Argument 
Recall the third premise of the Main Argument: 
(3) For any propositions p and q, if (i) I cannot be certain 
that p is false, and (ii) p entails q, then I cannot be certain 
that q is false. 
First, a preliminary note about “entails” as it appears in (ii). For 
the move from (1) and (2) to (4) to be valid, the “entails” in clause 
(ii) of premise (3) must refer to whatever sort of entailment 
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53. When the Inner Sense Model's internal scanner is functioning 
properly (assuming a good design plan), if my first-order experiential 
state has the quale P, then the scanner will produce a second-order 
representation which, while not itself having quale P, represents that 
the first-order state has quale P. However, it is in principle possible to 
manipulate the mechanism such that, even though my first-order 
experiential state has the quale P, the second-order representation 
produced by the scanner represents that the first-order state does not 
have quale P.  
54. However introspection works on Kriegel’s view, if the introspective 
mechanism is functioning properly (assuming to a good design plan), 
if I am visually aware that p, my introspective mechanism will 
produce a representation in virtue of which I am introspectively 
aware that I am visually aware that p. However, this mechanism may 
be manipulated such that, even though I am visually aware that p, it 
produces a representation in virtue of which I am introspectively 
aware that I am not visually aware that p. 
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relation is expressed as holding between the antecedent and 
consequent of premise (2). I take it that there is no algorithmic 
way of settling the claim made by (2), as there is, by contrast, with 
claims of first-order entailment. In this way, the consequence 
relation claimed by (2) is akin to the relation claimed by the 
proposition that for any x, if x is a prime minister, x is not a prime 
number. I take it that we have epistemic faculties that at least can 
deliver certainty regarding matters such as these, matters which 
we have no algorithmic method of settling.55 
If so, then (3) can be proven indirectly: assuming that (3) is 
false results in a contradiction. To see this, suppose first that you 
cannot be certain that some proposition p is false, i.e. that your 
epistemic faculties cannot deliver certainty that p is false. Suppose 
further that p entails some other proposition q. (You may or may 
not believe that p entails q.) Now suppose that, contrary to (3), you 
can be certain that q is false.  
I take it to follow obviously that in such a case you at least 
can be certain that p is false. All it would take is for your epistemic 
faculties to deliver certainty that p entails q, and certainty of 
modus tollens. You may as a matter of fact not realize that p 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
55 Just to be crystal clear, “entails” as it appears in (3) is not equivalent to 
mere material implication. As we know, material implication is a sad 
model of genuine entailment. 
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entails q, and you may not believe that p is false. Nevertheless it is 
true that you can be certain that p is false. But then we stumble 
onto a contradiction. Attempting to construct an instance in which 
the antecedent of this conditional is true while the consequent is 
false results in absurdity. And so we should accept that (3) is true. 
Consider also the following proposition, which is logically 
equivalent to (3):56 
(3*) For any propositions p and q, if (i) I can be certain that 
p is true, and (ii) p entails q, then I can be certain that q is 
true. 
Think about an instance in which the antecedent is true: for some 
p and q, p entails q and your epistemic faculties at least can deliver 
certainty that p is true. In this case, you cannot be certain that q is 
true only if your epistemic faculties cannot even in principle 
deliver certainty that p entails q, or certainty of modus ponens. Yet 
surely you at least can be certain of those things. So we should 
accept (3*) and its equivalent: (3) itself.  
 
7. What to Do with (4) in the Main Argument 
 Premise (4) follows from premises (1)-(3): 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
56. The contrapositive of (3) is this: For any p and q, if I can be certain that 
q is false, then either <it’s false that p entails q> or <I can be certain 
that p is false>. Now let p represent that q is false and let q represent 
that p is false. (3*) is now obviously equivalent. 
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(4) So, supposing that the Complex View is true, I cannot 
be certain that I could not gain good evidence that I am 
feeling fierce pain right now. 
What (4) tells me, substantially, is that either the Complex View is 
false or I can’t be certain that my belief that I am not experiencing 
fierce pain right now is indefeasible. I cannot rationally deny both 
of these; at least one is true. Which option I take should be 
determined by which I find more credible. If I find the antecedent 
of (4) more credible than the negation of the consequent, I should 
run a modus ponens. If on the other hand I find the negation of 
the consequent more credible than the antecedent, I should run a 
modus tollens. If I find the antecedent and the negation of the 
consequent equally credible, I ought to remain agnostic.  
For what it’s worth, I am strongly inclined to deny the 
consequent. There is very little I find more credible than that I can 
be certain that my belief that I am not experiencing fierce pain 
right now is indefeasible. Though I’m occasionally bothered by 
skeptical arguments aimed at every bit of my knowledge of the 
external world, I am never bothered by parallel skeptical 
arguments aimed at every bit of my knowledge of the inner 
world, so to speak. I am supremely confident that I could not 
receive any compelling evidence that, contrary to appearances, I 
really am experiencing fierce pain right now. My experience may 
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change—I may suddenly step in a rusty bear trap, for example—
but given my current experience, surely nothing could defeat my 
belief that I am not experiencing fierce pain. I am far more 
confident of this than I am of the suggestion that, for example, I 
am a brain and my mental life is (or is a product of) the interaction 
of some of that brain’s parts. And so I have a powerful argument 
against the Complex View, and in favor of the Simple View.  
 
8. Objections 
8.1 Tu Quoque 
I use the Main Argument to support the Simple View. 
Some readers have suspected that I richly deserve a tu quoque 
response, since to them the inference in premise (1) seems equally 
valid in the case of the Simple View. That is, these objectors urge 
the plausibility of: 
(1*) Supposing that the Simple View is true, I cannot be 
certain that introspection is not a causal series of events 
extended in time. 
And if (1*) is plausible, then of course the Main Argument could 
be turned against the Simple View. If (1) and (1*) are equally 
plausible, then whatever motivation the Main Argument 
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originally produced for the Simple View is neutralized by this 
revised argument. 
 My response is that (1*) is not plausible, or at least not as 
plausible at (1). The reason, ultimately, is that there is nothing 
about the Simple View that forces open the possibility of 
mechanistic introspection, while the same is not true of the 
Complex View. Mechanistic introspection may be ruled out from 
the armchair on the Simple View, but not on the Complex View.  
Let me show you how. First, we will suppose that the 
Simple View is true. The Simple View does not have much 
content—it is just the denial of the Complex View. Now, our best 
bet to rule out the possibility of mechanistic introspection is, I 
believe, by running a modus tollens on something like premise (2) 
in the Main Argument. It would go like this: clearly, if 
introspection were mechanistic, then my belief that I’m not in 
fierce pain right now would be defeasible—all I would need is 
evidence that the mechanism malfunctioned. But since my belief 
that I am not in fierce pain right now is clearly indefeasible, it 
follows that introspection is not mechanistic.  
Notice well that, as we close the door on the possibility of 
mechanistic introspection on the Simple View, it freely glides 
shut. Nothing in the nature of the Simple View forces open the 
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broadly logical possibility of mechanistic introspection. The 
Simple View is light on content, and so it presents no obstacle to a 
modus tollens on premise (2). And so, in this way, one in fact can 
be certain that introspection is not mechanistic, on the Simple 
View. Therefore, (1*) is implausible and—if the original premise 
(1) of the Main Argument is more plausible—the tu quoque 
objection fails. 
 Premise (1) in the Main Argument says that, if the 
Complex View is true, then we can’t be certain that introspection 
is not mechanistic. At this point, you may be wondering whether 
premise (1) in the Main Argument really is plausible, and whether 
I didn’t just sneak it by you back there in §4. After all, you might 
think, if it is so easy to be certain that introspection is not 
mechanistic on the Simple View, couldn’t we likewise gain that 
certainty on the Complex View?  
I think not, and here’s why. Let’s try to be certain that 
introspection is not mechanistic, on the Complex View. First, we 
will suppose that the Complex View is true. Now—in contrast to 
the Simple View—the Complex View comes with heavy baggage. 
It entails that each of us is a complex thing—a thing with parts—
and each of our mental lives is (or is a result of) the causal 
interaction of some of these parts. Now, again, our best bet to rule 
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out the possibility of mechanistic introspection is, I believe, by 
running a modus tollens on something like premise (2) in the 
Main Argument. But notice here that, as we try to shut the door 
on the possibility of mechanistic introspection, we encounter some 
firm resistance: the nature of the Complex View gets in the way, 
insisting on the possibility of mechanistic introspection. For 
consider the set of possible worlds in which we are complexes like 
brains, and our mental lives supervene on the causal interaction of 
our parts. Isn’t it obvious that, within this set of worlds, there are 
worlds in which introspection is a causal series of events extended 
in time? Consider also that, on the Complex View, I already know 
that other of my physically-realized belief-producing processes are 
mechanistic, e.g. perception. My introspective beliefs may result 
from a similar mechanism in a brain, if I just am a brain. We 
cannot shut the door on that broadly logical possibility from the 
armchair, given the hypothesis that I am a complex object like a 
brain.  
In sum: aided by something like the Main Argument, one 
can come to see clearly that mechanistic introspection is 
impossible, in a way perfectly compatible with the Simple View. 
And so (1*) is not plausible. On the Complex View, however, 
mechanistic introspection clearly seems broadly logically possible, 
and so it cannot be ruled out from the armchair. And so (1) is 
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quite plausible. Therefore, since (1*) is less compelling than (1), 
the views are not on a par, contrary to what the tu quoque 
objection insists. Reflection on introspective certainty provides, 
therefore, a compelling argument against the Complex View, an 
argument that cannot return the favor to the Simple View. 
One final thought. The main argument of this paper can be 
recast in terms of Bayesian confirmation. What the argument 
shows is that introspection cannot be mechanistic. We can 
compare the probability of this proposition conditional on the 
Complex View and conditional on the Simple View. How likely is 
it that introspection should not be mechanistic, assuming that the 
Complex View is true? Quite unlikely, I should think. On the 
other hand, how likely is it that introspection should not be 
mechanistic, assuming that the Simple View is true? Not nearly as 
unlikely, I should think. But then we have confirming evidence for 
the Simple View and disconfirming evidence for the Complex 
View.  
 
8.2 Constitution and Incorrigibility 
 It has been suggested in the philosophical literature that 
the phenomenal character of a subject’s experience is “taken up” 
into her corresponding introspective beliefs—that some of those 
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very abstract objects that constitute the representational content of 
her visual experience also (at least partially) constitute the 
representational content of her introspective belief about that 
experience. Some say phenomenal concepts are “quotational”: 
they are said to “include” or “contain” the very phenomenal 
properties they refer to (see, for example, Chalmers 2003 and 
Block 2006).  
Assuming sense can be given to its metaphors, such a 
theory would presumably secure an incorrigibility thesis along the 
lines of the one discussed in Jackson 1973: That S believes at t that 
he is in pain at t via introspection broadly logically guarantees that 
S is in pain at t. Similarly, that the Statue of Liberty is on the pedestal 
at t broadly logically entails that matter is on the pedestal at t. And, 
importantly, introspection could work this way and yet be a 
temporally extended causal chain of events. 
And so an objector might urge that premise (2) is false, 
saying “Look, here’s an account of introspection according to 
which it is a temporally extended causal chain, and yet according 
to which one may be certain about some introspective beliefs. 
Given the constitutive relation between the experience and the 
belief, the subject’s belief has a very high epistemic status—the 
belief couldn’t be false. And so this belief may rightly be said to be 
 149!
certain for the subject. No evidence would make it reasonable for 
her to believe that she is in fierce pain.” 
The objection includes something like the following steps:  
Constitution: Introspective beliefs are at least partly 
constituted by the states they are about.  
Therefore,  
Incorrigibility: That S introspectively believes she is in 
phenomenal state P at time t broadly logically guarantees 
that S is in P at t.  
Therefore,  
Certainty: We have an explanation of the certainty of at 
least some introspective beliefs.  
And, 
Compatibility: This explanation is compatible with 
mechanistic introspection. 
Therefore,  
Counterexample: Premise (2) in the Main Argument is 
false.  
In what follows, I will give three critical responses to this 
objection. 
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My first response to this objection is that the inference 
from Certainty and Compatibility to Counterexample is invalid. 
Even if we grant that this constitution story is compatible with 
mechanistic introspection and that it can explain the certainty of 
introspective beliefs like I am aware that there’s fierce pain, how does 
the story go with respect to what we may call “negative” 
introspective beliefs such as I am aware that there’s no fierce pain? 
Right now, I have that belief and it is true. Yet it cannot be that 
some constituent of my experience is “taken up” into the 
introspective belief, since the introspective belief accurately 
represents that a certain phenomenal quality, namely fierce pain, 
is absent from the content of my experience.57 And so the objector 
has not yet provided an account according to which introspection 
is mechanistic and yet I can be certain that I am aware that there’s 
no fierce pain. And so premise (2) is unchallenged, since the 
proposed constitution story does not apply to negative 
introspective beliefs. Indeed, my Main Argument intentionally 
concerns a negative introspection belief in order to sidestep just 
such an objection. 
My second response is that a theory that entails anything 
like Incorrigibility has highly implausible consequences. Such a 
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57. John Pollock (1986, 32-33) discusses this problem for constitution 
theories, i.e. theories which endorse what he calls the “Containment 
Thesis.”  
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theory would entail, for example, that the following case is 
impossible: 
Paint Store: I am at a paint store, looking at samples. I 
hold a maroon color sample in the center of my visual 
field, which thereby tokens only maroon. Nevertheless, I 
misidentify the color and believe that I am visually 
experiencing scarlet in the center of my visual field. 
Surely this story is coherent.58 (My wife testifies that this is a 
common occurrence in my own life.) Yet, according to this 
constitution theory, that I introspectively believe that I am 
experiencing scarlet in the center of my visual field broadly logically 
guarantees that I am experiencing scarlet in the center of my visual 
field. So, if this constitution theory is right, Paint Store is 
incoherent. Yet since Paint Store is coherent, we should reject this 
constitution theory. And so this theory cannot offer us an 
objection to the Main Argument.59 The objection stalls at the first 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
58
 Alan Goldman (2004, 282) agrees: “If one is inattentive, drugged, or 
otherwise imbalanced, he can misapply concepts to his own 
experiences and generate false beliefs about them.” Goldman there 
also cites a case from John Pollock (2001, 43), saying: “...people 
typically and inattentively describe ways shadows appear on snow as 
gray, since they simply assume that shadows are gray, when in fact 
they appear blue.” 
59. Perhaps a version of the constitution theory survives, restricted to 
introspective beliefs like “I am aware of this,” or the kind of beliefs 
recently discussed by Horgan and Kriegel (2007), or Chalmers’ (2003) 
“direct phenomenal beliefs.” But none of these theories furnishes an 
objection to the Main Argument, since none of them entails that my 
introspective belief that I am not experiencing fierce pain right now is 
incorrigible. Such theories explain, at most, the introspective certainty 
of some conceptually stripped-down, relatively content-less 
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steps: Incorrigibility above is false, and therefore so is 
Constitution, and so again the objection does not reach the 
conclusion that premise (2) in the Main Argument is false. 
 My third and final response is that nothing in the 
neighborhood of Incorrigibility is sufficient to explain the kind of 
epistemic certainty that attends some of our introspective beliefs. 
That is, for example, the inference from if S believes she’s in pain at t 
then she is in pain at t to the conclusion that S is certain that she’s in 
pain at t is invalid, and so the move from Incorrigibility to 
Certainty above fails. For consider that the number of hairs on 
your head is either even or odd. Suppose the number of hairs on 
your head is even here in the actual world, @. Given this 
supposition, it is true that if you believe the number of hairs on 
your head is even in @, then the number of hairs on your head is 
even in @. And that conditional is necessarily true, given that the 
proposition in question is a true world-indexed proposition. 
Across modal space, any creature with that belief believes truly; 
we have here necessary reliability and, indeed, incorrigibility. 
And yet, despite the incorrigibility of this belief, it scarcely 
follows that this belief would be certain for you, were you to hold 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
introspective beliefs. And so they won’t help explain the certainty of 
an introspective belief like I am not in fierce pain right now, which has 
substantially more conceptual content. It features the concept PAIN, 
for example, which none of the beliefs that concern Horgan and 
Kriegel or Chalmers do. 
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it. You would not be entitled to believe it, come what may. You 
lack any grounds at all for that belief, let alone the absolutely 
indefeasible grounds required for certainty. Evidently, the sort of 
incorrigibility thesis that the constitution story secures has little or 
nothing to do with justification and certainty. It follows, therefore, 
that even if an incorrigibility thesis in this neighborhood were 
true—and I argued above that it isn’t—it would not by itself be 
enough to explain how I might be certain that I am not in fierce 
pain right now even if introspection is mechanistic. Since the 
move from Incorrigibility to Certainty above is invalid, the 
objection to premise (2) in the Main Argument again fails. 
 
8.3 Constitution and Self-Intimation 
 In the previous section, we considered a theory of 
introspection on which introspective beliefs are partly constituted 
by the first-order states they are about. Such a theory would 
secure an incorrigibility thesis, as we said. But one might also 
wonder whether the constitution relation holds in the other 
direction. That is, one might wonder whether first-order 
phenomenal states like fierce pains are themselves partly 
composed of introspective awareness or belief. This view is not 
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unprecedented in the literature,60 and it would secure an 
intuitively attractive self-intimation thesis: necessarily, if a subject 
is in fierce pain, then she’s aware that she is.61 And this view could 
be happily married with the suggestion from Lewis (1972, 258) 
that while the state S which normally plays the pain role might not 
be followed by the state S* that plays the awareness-of-pain role, 
under such conditions S would fail to satisfy our commonsense 
platitudes about pain and would therefore not be the referent of 
our theoretical term “pain.”  
 It is not immediately obvious how such a self-intimation 
thesis might challenge the Main Argument. Exactly which 
premise(s) would it call into question? I believe it holds most 
promise of providing a counterexample to premise (2) in the Main 
Argument: an account of mechanistic introspection on which, 
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60 Views like this are discussed in Weatherson 2004 (379) as well as 
Horgan and Kriegel 2007. Shoemaker (1990) thinks that at least some 
phenomenal states are “constitutively self-intimating,” saying (2001)  
“it is of the essence of a state’s having a certain phenomenal character 
that this issues in the subject’s being introspectively aware of that 
character, or does so if the subject reflects.” I’m concerned with this 
type of view in the text. Yet in other places, Shoemaker is careful to 
add the qualification that self-intimation doesn’t occur with broadly 
logical necessity, but only under normal conditions, or absent 
malfunction. Such a qualified view would presumably be much less 
helpful to our objector here, since one’s belief that one is properly 
functioning is far from certain. For that reason, I don’t discuss this 
weaker, more qualified view here in the text. 
61 Or at least she would be, were she to introspect. I thank an anonymous 
referee for this journal for urging me to consider a constitution theory 
along these lines, and its implications for my Main Argument. 
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nevertheless, my belief that I’m not in fierce pain right now is 
indefeasible.  
The objector may reason this way: “Listen, on this view I 
just sketched for you, it is obvious that, necessarily, if a subject is 
in fierce pain, she is aware that she is (or at least she would be, 
were she to introspect). Since by introspection you can be certain 
that you don’t believe that you are in fierce pain, you can now run 
a modus tollens with that self-intimation thesis and conclude—
with certainty—that you are not in fierce pain. This account of 
introspection secures the self-intimation thesis and thereby 
explains the certainty of your belief that you are not in fierce pain, 
all the while being compatible with mechanistic introspection. 
Therefore, premise (2) in the Main Argument is false.” 
 This is a clever and interesting objection to the Main 
Argument. However, it passes the buck in a way that renders it, in 
the end, unsuccessful. Let’s retrace the dialectic. Initially, I was 
wondering how I might be certain that I am not in fierce pain, if 
introspection is mechanistic. The objection now under 
consideration begins with this advice: “in order to be certain that 
you are not in fierce pain, start by being certain that you don’t 
believe you are in fierce pain.” But, of course, my initial concern 
will reemerge at this higher level—the problem has been merely 
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kicked upstairs, and the Main Argument can be redeployed 
against this new introspective belief. For how might I be certain 
that I don’t believe that I am in fierce pain, if introspection is 
mechanistic? The same considerations about the fragility of causal 
process that first led me to worry about the epistemic status of my 
introspective belief that I’m not in fierce pain apply just as strongly 
to my introspective belief that I don’t believe that I’m in fierce pain. 
Sure, it seems like I don’t believe that I am in fierce pain, but if 
introspection is mechanistic there remains a possibility—remote, 
to be sure, but real nonetheless—that my introspective mechanism 
is malfunctioning, delivering the belief that I don’t believe I am in 
fierce pain, when I really do believe that. Therefore, the objection 
has not yet explained how I may be certain that I am not in fierce 
pain right now, if introspection is mechanistic. 
 In other words, the objection promises me certainty that I 
am not in fierce pain, but only if I first gain certainty that I don’t 
believe I am. Yet the objection does not explain how I might be 
certain that I don’t believe I am in fierce pain. In this way, the 
objection passes the buck in an unsatisfactory way; it writes me a 
check that I cannot cash. And so, ultimately, the objection does not 
succeed in explaining how I might be certain that I am not in 
fierce pain even if introspection is mechanistic. And so, in the end, 
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it does not succeed in providing a counterexample to premise (2) 
in the Main Argument. 
 Secondly, this objection has it that my justification for 
believing that I am not in fierce pain right now is inferential, and in 
addition that this inference crucially depends on my knowledge of 
the self-intimation thesis. This strikes me as implausible on both 
counts: first, many people lack a belief in the self-intimation thesis, 
and yet are nevertheless certain—entitled to believe, come what 
may—that they’re not in fierce pain right now. Children, for 
example. Second, even supposing that a person grasps and 
believes the self-intimation thesis, he may lack the cognitive 
resources to perform the somewhat complicated inference from 
that belief and his introspective belief that he doesn’t believe he is 
in fierce pain to the conclusion that he is not in fierce pain. And 
yet, nevertheless, such a person may be certain that he is not in 
fierce pain; his grounds may make it such that no additional 
evidence should lower his credence. Children, again, serve as 
examples here. Since this objection has these two implausible 
consequences, we should again reject it as ultimately unsuccessful. 
 
8.4 Nothing is Certain 
 158!
I take the Main Argument to provide evidence against the 
Complex View. But that final conclusion is warranted only if it’s 
true that some of our introspective beliefs are genuinely 
indefeasible. I assume that this is true, and that I am not in 
excruciating pain right now is such a belief. This assumption might 
be called into question, however. For example, Hartry Field (2000, 
118) claims that “the credibility of any proposition could be 
diminished by evidence that well-regarded experts don’t accept 
it.”62 (In order for this to spell trouble for those of us who think 
some propositions are absolutely indefeasible, we must take the 
“could” in Field’s quotation to mean something like “should.”) If 
Field is right, then it’s mistaken for me to assume that I am not in 
excruciating pain right now is indefeasible, and to use this 
assumption to conclude that the Complex View is false. 
 In response, I ask the reader to consider Field’s claim 
carefully. Is it really true that any proposition could rationally be 
called into question by expert testimony against it? Take, for 
example, the proposition that I exist. Ought I to diminish my 
credence in that proposition in the event that well-regarded 
experts claim otherwise? I doubt it. If I take myself to be receiving 
evidence from experts, must I not take myself to exist? Consider 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
62
 See also Quine’s 1951 famous claim that “no statement is immune to 
revision” and Kitcher’s 1983 objections to the apriorist program. 
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also the proposition that there are experts. Could it ever be 
reasonable to diminish one’s credence in that proposition in light 
of evidence that one takes to be from experts? Surely any evidence 
that one gains from experts ought to increase one’s credence in the 
proposition that there are experts, not diminish it. It’s not the case, 
then, that expert testimony should always reduce our confidence. 
And I can see no other source of evidence that would fare better. 
(Not even testimony from God would convince me that I don’t 
exist, for example.) I conclude, then, that some propositions are 
certain for us; we do occasionally enjoy absolute indefeasibility. 
And as far as I can tell, the proposition that I am not in excruciating 
pain right now is in that category. Therefore, it is not illegitimate 
for me to wield this assumption as I have in this paper, as part of 
an argument for the conclusion that the Complex View is false. 
 
9. Conclusion  
 In this paper, I have developed and defended a novel 
argument for the conclusion that I am not a brain, a body, or any 
object with parts. Philosophers who wish to maintain the standard 
materialist account of human persons on which introspection is 
mechanistic must square their shoulders and accept the 
unpalatable consequence that introspection is hyperfallible, i.e. 
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that we can never be certain of any introspective belief. For the 
rest of us: introspection is not hyperfallible, and so introspection is 
not mechanistic. And surely at least some of our introspective 
beliefs are immune to defeat. Therefore the Complex View is false.  
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